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CRIMINAL LAW
LIBERALS, CONSERVATIVES, AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE*
LANE V. SUNDERLAND"
I. INTRODUCTION
Thie rule requiring exclusion of illegally seized
evidence from judicial proceedings has been ana-
lyzed, litigated, and otherwise written about to
such an extent that ample justification must ac-
company yet another treatment.' Even the most
distinguished commentators and judges character-
istically assess the doctrine of exclusion from a short
or medium-range policy perspective. Ordinarily
the policy analysis crncentrates on whether or not
the exclusionary rule deters unconstitutional police
behavior. Considering that the doctrine as yet lacks
a clear and persuasive constitutional mandate, it is
understandable that courts and commentators
have relied extensively on empirical studies of de-
terrence to buttress their respective positions.
2
One of the most thorough and frequently cited
articles discussing the deterrence rationale is Dallin
Oaks' piece, Studying the Exclusionay Rule in Search
and Seizure.3 His analysis focuses on the "factual
justification" of deterrence after summarily ac-
knowledging the concept of judicial integrity, the
doctrine that the judiciary ought not serve as an
accomplice in the executive branch's disobedience
of the law.4 The article's abandonment of consid-
erations of constitutional principle, the dilution of
* I am indebted to the National Endowment for the
Humanities for supporting me through a 1979-80 Re-
search Fellowship during which time this article was
written.
** Associate Professor and Chairman, Department of
Political Science and International Relations, Knox Col-
lege.
'The exclusionary rule affects illegal activities other
than those related to search and seizure, the object of this
inquiry. Exemplary of other applications of the exclu-
sionary rule are confessions, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966); counsel, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977); lineups, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967); identifications, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); and a denial of due process through police meth-
ods which shock the conscience, Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
2 See section IV infra.
3 Oaks, Studying the Exclusiona.y Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CHi. L. REv. 665 (1970).
4 Id. at 668-72.
the judicial integrity argument, and the elevation
of deterrence as the dispositive consideration are
characteristic of the literature and caselaw
5
Judges and commentators not relying on deter-
rence studies generally have advanced partisan
arguments which are unsound in theory or princi-
ple. On the one hand, some opposing exclusion
view it as a liberal device for coddling criminals
and as an unwelcome constraint on police enforce-
ment of the criminal law. On the other hand, as
Oaks points out, the rule's supporters assert "the
deterrent effect of the rule, and then have sup-
ported that effect by recourse to polemic, rhetoric,
and intuition."6 An attempt to go beyond the
polemic, rhetoric, and intuition of both liberal and
conservative quarters justifies the present inquiry.
Analysis of certain of the empirical studies in
this article will reveal what they have to teach and
determine how this affects the exclusion contro-
versy. Wayne LaFave's encyclopedic treatise on
search and seizure summarizes the deterrence con-
troversy in this way: "there is some evidence avail-
able as to when the exclusionary rule does not deter
and also some evidence indicating that it some-
times does deter.",7 Even if the studies are inconclu-
5 In his extended treatment of search and seizure,
Professor Wayne R. LaFave begins his three volume
treatise on search and seizure with a chapter on the
exclusionary rule. The first sentence of this chapter on
exclusion characterizes the exclusionary rule as a remedy
for police violations of the fourth amendment. 1 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 3 (1978).
6 Oaks, supra note 3, at 754-55.
7 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 26. Political scientist
Steven R. Schlesinger argues in a recent article, for
example, that "the burden is on proponents of the exclu-
sionary rule to show that it is an effective deterrent."
Because "the current Supreme Court considers deterrence
to be the primary justification for the rule," Schlesinger
argues that if "the rule is not an effective deterrent, then
it is appropriate for the Court to reconsider its position."
He attempts to show that "according to the available
empirical evidence, the rule is not an effective deterrent
against police misbehavior." Schlesinger, The Exclusionary
Rule: Have Proponents Proven that it is a Deterrent to Police?,
62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979). In a companion article, polit-
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sive, they must be examined to determine their
appropriate role in deciding the exclusionary con-
troversy.
Some analysts go beyond the issue of deterring
illegal police conduct in justifying exclusion. Char-
acteristically these commentators and judges'em-
phasize the consideration of judicial integrity al-
though they rarely define the concept. If they do
define it, they ordinarily fail to explain the reason
for its being a constitutional requirement. The
most frequently adduced argument, however, is
that the court must avoid tainting its integrity by
participating in the illegal behavior of other
branches of government.'
The caselaw, however, has supplanted the con-
cept ofjudicial integrity with deterrence as the sole
judicial rationale for exclusion. Having been col-
lapsed into a deterrence rationale by a majority of
the Court, the concept ofjudicial integrity has lost
its independent potency. This interpretation of
judicial integrity appears to complete the transfor-
mation of the exclusionary rule from a doctrine
derived, albeit inadequately, from constitutional
principle, to a rule based on the judges' assessment
of the policy consideration of deterrence.
The desirability and consequences of this trans-
formation constitute important justifications for
further inquiry into the exclusionary rule. A num-
ber of other reasons justify further inquiry. The
most obvious emanates from a justifiable concern
over characteristics of our criminal justice system
potentially contributing to an increasing crime
rate. Some commentators refer to the exclusionary
rule as one of the "legal technicalities" which
pander to criminals and may result in the failure
to convict those guilty of crimes.9 The moral indig-
nation underlying the charge of coddling criminals
understandably increases both with the severity of
the crime and with the technical character of the
"constable's blunder."
Although recent crime statistics underscore the
threat to the public safety which Thomas Hobbes
ical scientist Bradley Canon, who has done empirical
research of his own on the deterrent effect of exclusion, is
more guarded than Schlesinger. Canon concludes: "Ex-
isting data at the present time make it impossible to
establish empirically a universal 'yes, it works' or a 'no,
it doesn't work' conclusion-or even anything approxi-
mating such a conclusion." Canon, The Exclusionary Rule:
Have Critics Proven that it Doesn't Deter Police? 62 JUDICATURE
398 (1979).
8 See generally Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial
Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary
Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129, 1133 (1973).
9 See section III infra.
so harshly emphasizes, 10 it would be grossly precip-
itous to attack exclusion on the grounds of security,
or as a liberal device to free criminals, without
recognizing that the exclusionary rule may be in-
separably bound to a constitutional government's
effecting the great ends of freedom. As John Locke
recognizes, the threat to our personal freedom and
security lies not only with other individuals acting
in the state of nature, but even more profoundly
with tyrannical government."1 Thus, the question
of exclusion is not one of simply pitting rampant
crime and the exclusionary rule against civic order,
security, and safety.
At one level, an inquiry into the constitutional
requirements of the exclusionary rule is an inquiry
into the general question of government under a
written constitution and the concomitant implica-
tion for a theory of constitutional interpretation. If
one takes seriously a written constitution as a re-
pository of individual rights and a grant of only
limited powers to government, then it requires a
systematic argument to show that the principles of
this Constitution mandate the exclusionary rule.
The most important aspect of this article is dem-
onstration of constitutionally based rationales for
exclusion. The entire analysis is informed by and
directed toward this thesis.
The article will proceed from an examination of
liberal defenses to conservative criticisms of exclu-
sion. Although these arguments may provide a
valuable perspective, they are neither dispositive
nor rooted in constitutional principle. Although it
is necessary and useful to analyze certain of the
empirical studies used by courts and commentators
in reliance on deterrence as the dispositive issue,
such studies are insufficient to answer the deter-
rence question. This article will advance the argu-
ment that deterrence as the dispositive question
must yield to constitutional principle to determine
whether the exclusionary rule should be retained
or abolished.
II. LIBERALS, THE DUE PROCESS MODEL, AND
EXCLUSION
A. THE LIBERAL CREDO AND PACKER'S DUE PROCESS
MODEL
The contemporary debate over the exclusionary
rule is representative of a more general debate in
American criminal and constitutional law. Its roots
grow out of a general argument over the causes of
0 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIII (London 1651).
11J. LOCKE, Second Treatise § 137 in Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT (London 1690).
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crime, the appropriate governmental responses to
crime, and the relationship of sound governmental
policy to constitutional requirements and defend-
ants' rights. Too often, the academic and judicial
commentary on exclusion is unduly narrow and
does not adequately acknowledge the broader is-
sues underlying exclusion. This neglect narrows the
focus of the exclusionary argument and also makes
less likely the raising of the argument beyond the
poles of its ideological parents, the doctrines of
liberalism and conservatism, to a higher plane of
constitutionalism. In order for the argument to
progress to the level of constitutional analysis, it is
necessary to recognize and examine the broad ide-
ological positions on crime and relate them to the
controversy over exclusion. Recognition and clari-
fication of exclusion's relationship to liberalism and
conservatism are necessary in an attempt to tran-
scend this bipolar partisanship and to achieve a
principled analysis.
A well known spokesman for liberalism in recent
years is Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General
under President Lyndon Johnson. 12 Clark deals
with several aspects of crime ranging from its na-
ture and causes to the breakdown and reform of
courts and prosecutors. In discussing the nature
and causes of crime, he adopts the liberal postulate
that criminals are products of the sociopolitical
system:
If we are to deal meaningfully with crime, what
must be seen is the dehumanizing effect on the
individual of slums, racism, ignorance and violence,
of corruption and impotence to fulfill rights, of
poverty and unemployment and idleness, of gener-
ations of malnutrition, of congenital brain damage
and prenatal neglect, of pollution, of decrepit, dirty,
ugly, unsafe, overcrowded housing, of alcoholism
and narcotics addiction, of avarice, anxiety, fear,
hatred, hopelessness and injustice. These are the
fountainheads of crime. They can be controlled. As
imprecise, distorted and prejudiced as our learning
is, these sources of crime and their controllability
clearly emerge to any who would see."
Social conditions produce victims who in turn
violate the criminal law and are then subjected to
the criminal process. It is not surprising that Clark
objects to measures set forth to serve the ends of
self-protection. A justice system based on self-pro-
12 R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA (1970). I am indebted
to Professor Peter Schotten for his helpful comments
regarding exclusion and the development of arguments
contained herein, especially those in sections II and III.
"aId. at 17-18.
tection is, according to Clark, ajustice system based
on fear, and fear is detrimental to true justice.
Clark writes:
We are not yet so far from the jungle that self-
preservation has ceased to be our basic instinct.
Crime threatens self-preservation and stimulates
age-old emotions. The most dangerous of these is
fear. Reason fades as fear deprives us of any concern
or compassion for others. When fear turns our con-
cern entirely to self-protection, those who must have
our help if crime is to be controlled lose that chance.
Finally, fear can destroy our desire for justice itself.
Then there is little hope. We are prepared to deny
justice to obtain what unreasoning, overpowering
emotion falsely tells us will be security. Arm your-
self, suppress dissent, invade privacy, urge police to
trick and deceive, force confessions, jail without
trial, brutalize in prisons, execute the poor and the
weak. Due process can wait-we want safety! Naked
power becomes sovereign. Only force can rise to
meet it. The end is violence.
14
Clark argues that by exercising the requisite moral
leadership, the law can make a major contribution
to erasing crime and removing the false conflict
between liberty and safety. Greater freedom flow-
ing from nonrepressive law will result in greater
human dignity and decreased crime. On the other
hand, as Clark writes, "[m]isused, the system of
criminal justice can destroy liberty and cause
crime."1 5 Implicit in this model is a general distrust
of the motives and competency of the police officer.
Accordingly, proponents of liberalism advocate
narrowing the range of police discretion.
From this liberal perspective it is an easy step to
what Professor Herbert Packer refers to as the "due
process model" of criminal justice administration,
a model he compares and contrasts with the "crime
control model." 6 Packer identifies the first premise
of the due process model as a distrust of the infor-
mal, nonadjudicative factfinding process resulting
from its potential for error. This distrust leads to
insistence that an adjudicative adversary process is
necessary at the factfinding stage. An impartial
tribunal would conduct the proceedings and pro-
vide an opportunity for the accused to discredit the
case against him. Because of its emphasis on avoid-
ing factual errors, the demand for finality is very
low in this model.' 7
14 Id. at 19.
15 Id. at 20, 116, 274.
16 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (1964).
17Id. at 14. Packer suggests that according to this
model, some subsequent scrutiny or review of the formal
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The due process model values the individual and
thus seeks to place limitations on the exercise of
official power. The model views discretion in the
criminal justice system as particularly subject to
abuse and therefore acknowledges guilt not simply
on a factual determination of probability, but only
if the factual determination is made by officials
carrying out duly allocated powers in a procedur-
ally regular manner. Proponents of this model must
concede that the controls and safeguards necessary
to prevent such official oppression result in sub-
stantial diminution in the efficiency of the criminal
process.
Among the rules safeguarding the process, the
concept of presumed innocence in the due process
model qualifies the use of the criminal sanction
against the individual by allowing defenses which
are unrelated to factual guilt. This possibility of
legal innocence expands when viewing the criminal
process as the proper forum for correction of its
own abuses. This strand of the model applies spe-
cifically to exclusion because of the reliability of
the evidence which is suppressed in order to vin-
dicate the rules of the criminal process. This sup-
pression, of course, fatally impairs the process'
efficiency.
18
Another important plank in Packer's due process
model is equality. In a nutshell, "there can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has."' 9 Packer
emphasizes that since the government initiates the
criminal process which may result in governmen-
tally imposed deprivations, the public has an "ob-
ligation to ensure that financial inability does not
destroy the capacity of an accused to assert what
may be meritorious challenges to the processes
being invoked against him." 20 This aspect of
Packer's argument relates to the presumption of
innocence and the various qualifying doctrines lim-
iting use of the criminal sanction which this pre-
sumption requires. Assuming the desirability of
these doctrines, the concept of equality requires
that they apply to all and thus imposes further due
process requirements on government, including
process should be available as long as alleged factual
errors have not received an adjudicative hearing in a
factfinding context.
18 Id. at 17-18. Other rules safeguarding the process
cover a wide range of matters such as jurisdiction, venue,
statute of limitations, double jeopardy and considerations
of criminal responsibility.
'9 Id. at 18 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19
(1956)).
2 Packer, supra note 16, at 19.
pre-eminently the right to counsel. 2' Right to coun-
sel makes it much more likely that the qualifying
and disabling doctrines will surface in the individ-
ual case.
22
Another strand of thought implicit in Packer's
due process model is "a mood of skepticism about
the morality and utility of the criminal sanction,
taken either as a whole or in some of its applica-
tions."'23 One element of this skepticism is the view
of criminal law as hypocritical in both adhering to
the outmoded concept of an individual able to
choose freely whether to obey the penal code and
punishing the psychologically and economically
crippled. This skepticism also casts doubt on the
view of law as an agent of education and deterrence
and regards the failure to rehabilitate offenders as
inhuman and wasteful. This view results in pres-
sures to curtail the discretion surrounding the ex-
ercise of the power of the criminal process.2
A final facet of Packer's due process model is its
effect on the role of the judiciary: "[b]ecause the
Due Process Model is basically a negative model,
asserting limits on the nature of official power and
on the modes of its exercise, its validating authority
is judicial and requires an appeal to supra-legisla-
tive law, to the law of the Constitution. '"25 Thus,
actualization of the due process model is ordinarily
accomplished by the judiciary's invocation of the
Constitution and all that judicial interpretation of
our fundamental law implies.
26
The foundation of what this article refers to as
"the liberal position" or "the liberal defense of
exclusion" is implicit in more general terms in
Clark's exposition of this position and in Packer's
due process model. It will be argued that the most
common liberal defenses of exclusion suffer from
the same defects as do the more general statements
of the liberal position. They all proceed from ide-
ological presuppositions to their proposed consti-
tutional policy rather than basing their recommen-
dations on constitutional principle. The relegation
of the Constitution to a position subservient to
21Id. at 19.
22 1d. at 20.
23 d.
24 Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441, 442-43.
Packer, supra note 16, at 22.
26 Id. at 22-23. Judicial pre-eminence is a consequence
of the due process model. Packer recognizes the strength
of this pre-eminence as being the appeal to the Consti-
tution as the "last and overriding word." The weakness
of the judicial sanction of nullity is that there may not be
a willingness of those outside the judiciary to apply its
negative prescriptions generally. Id.
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ideological presupposition is not, of course, the
peculiar defect of liberalism. Conservatives, it will
be shown, share this same defect. This subordina-
tion of the Constitution and its principles to policy
preferences does not show serious regard for the
principles of the Constitution nor for the view that
the Constitution itself settles certain policy issues.
If the Constitution has settled issues in the area
under discussion, then subordination of the Con-
stitution to ideological presuppositions reverses the
proper relationship between the Constitution and
public policy. The results of this reversing of the
proper role will become evident as the various
liberal and conservative arguments regarding ex-
clusion are examined.
B. SPELLING OUT THE CONTOURS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Thejudiciary's invocation of the Constitution in
Packer's due process model reflects the liberal credo
of Ramsey Clark. Clark's emphasis on the necessity
for government to "understand its role and adhere
to that role with absolute fidelity" leads to an
argument for substantial judicial involvement in
protecting defendants' rights. Clark states his view
of the matter plainly: "The truth is that the courts
and primarily the United States Supreme Court
have done more to right wrong, to perfect the
system, to speed the process and to bring equal
justice than the legislative and executive branches
combined., 27 This plank of the liberal argument
applies to the exclusion controversy insofar as ex-
clusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence pro-
vides the occasion for judicial interpretation of the
fourth amendment.ms This aspect of the liberal
argument, then, underscores exclusion as a device
to raise questions of constitutionality which other-
wise would not be adjudicated. As Packer recog-
nizes, the exclusionary rule directs judicial atten-
tion to police practices and thereby aids in the
development of comprehensive and clear fourth
amendment standards.
Professor LaFave is a strong supporter of this
view. He emphasizes the essential stimulus that
exclusion has provided in elaborating fourth
amendment requirements. Abandonment of exclu-
sion, in his view, would mean a return to the
situation existing prior to the 1960s when appellate
courts received search and seizure issues only in
appeals of tort actions against police officers.
Among the disadvantages of this type of review are
27 R. CLARK, supra note 12, at 204.
2 Oaks, supra note 3, at 756.
barriers which limit appeals and the tendency of
the civil suit context to divert attention from the
nature of the search and seizure to the fairness of
subjecting the officer to personal liability. LaFave
sees the exclusionary rule as providing an oppor-
tunity for more cases to reach the appellate level
and for appellate tribunals to face a variety of
factual situations. By facing a greater number of
cases, he argues, the appellate courts can better see
the specific cases as part of a more complementary
and rational whole.2
Other respected commentators likewise see util-
ity in the rule's insuring judicial attention to the
fourth amendment. Dean Paulsen sees the exclu-
sionary rule as giving
every prosecuted person an opportunity to vindicate
search and seizure principles for the benefit of all,
insofar as violations of these principles have resulted
in the production of evidence against the accused.
The accused has a motive to challenge the police
overreaching. He need not resort to another pro-
ceeding or hire another lawyer. The rule assures a
great deal ofjudicial attention to these questions. 0
The difficulty with the arguments of LaFave,
Paulsen, and others supporting exclusion as an
occasion for spelling out the contours of the fourth
amendment is their failure to address the more
fundamental question of whether the Constitution
requires exclusion. These arguments view exclusion
as a necessary means to articulate and actualize
the content of the fourth amendment, yet the
constitutional basis of exclusion itself remains
largely unexamined. The desirability of the Court's
spelling out the contours of the fourth amendment
implies the more fundamental assumption of the
propriety of exclusion as a consequence of judicial
review. It is thus difficult to justify the Court's
appointing itself to the task of spelling out the
contours of the fourth amendment without the
support of a generalized argument for judicial
review and the consequences of this argument for
exclusion. 1
2 LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclu-
sionaiy Rule-Part II: Defining the Norms and Training the
Police, 30 Mo. L. REv. 566, 580-82 (1965).
3o Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the
Police, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 255, 260 (1961). Dallin
Oaks asserts that the exclusionary rule "provides an
occasion forjudicial review" and "gives credibility to the
constitutional guarantees." Oaks, supra note 3, at 756.
Commentators correctly modify Oaks' position by rec-
ognizing that rather than being the occasion for or the
cause ofjudicial review, exclusion is the effect ofjudicial
review.
31 See text accompanying notes 282-88 infra.
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It is remarkable that the relationship of judicial
review to exclusion and the fourth amendment has
received so little attention from the judiciary. Chief
Justice Warren's majority opinion in Tery v. Ohio32
recognized the utility of exclusion in specifying the
meaning of the fourth amendment: "[T]hus in our
system evidentiary rulings provide the context in
which the judicial process of inclusion and exclu-
sion approves some conduct as comporting with
constitutional guarantees and disapproves other
actions by state agents."33 Justice Brennan, dis-
senting in United States v. Calandra,3 sees this prac-
tical consideration as onejustification for exclusion.
His opinion quotes from Dallin Oaks: "It is likewise
imperative to have a practical procedure by which
courts can review alleged violations of constitu-
tional rights and articulate the meaning of those
rights." 35 Unfortunately, neither of these opinions
goes beyond the practical necessity for a mecha-
nism to spell out the contours of the fourth amend-
ment to a principled, constitutional argument for
the exclusionary rule. Such probing would have
been extremely helpful in illuminating the consti-
tutional foundations of the exclusionary rule.
C. THE MAINTENANCE OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY AND
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT
A second aspect of Clark's liberal credo which
applies directly to the exclusionary controversy is
his insistence that government must act with integ-
rity. He casts the law in a role of moral leadership
which in turn may "permanently influence the
conduct of its citizens." For a people to be free of
crime, the government must act with integrity and
fairness. Constitutional rights must be redeemed at





Packer incorporates the theme of judicial integrity
in his due process model when discussing the doc-
trine of legal guilt. This doctrine requires that an
individual not be held guilty of crime merely be-
cause reliable evidence indicates the probability of
factual guilt: "he is not to be held guilty, even
though the factual determination is or might be
adverse to him, if various rules designed to safe-
guard the integrity of the process are not given
32 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
3id. at 13.
m 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
3 Id. at 366 (Brennan, Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dis-
senting) (quoting Oaks, supra note 3, at 756).
36 R. CLARK, supra note 12, at 206, 274.
effect .... , Packer's due process model draws this
judicially relevant consequence from the doctrine
of legal guilt:
Wherever the competence to make adequate factual
determinations lies, it is apparent that only a tri-
bunal that is aware of these guilt-defeating doctrines
and is willing to apply them can be viewed as
competent to make determinations of legal guilt.
The police and the prosecutors are ruled out by lack
of capacity in the first instance and by lack of
assurance of willingness in the second. Only an
impartial tribunal can be trusted to make determi-
nations of legal as opposed to factual guilt. 38
Clark's and Packer's considerations of govern-
mental integrity clearly apply to the exclusion
controversy. Clark's emphasis on law functioning
in a role of moral leadership and the due process
model's pointing to the integrity of the criminal
process are central to thejudicial integrity rationale
as initially articulated by the United States Su-
preme Court. 39
Perhaps the clearest statement of the judicial
integrity rationale for exclusion is the necessity for
exclusion of illegally seized evidence to preserve the
judiciary's unblemished nature and to keep its
actions beyond reproach. ° Professor LaFave's brief
treatment ofjudicial integrity emphasizes the doc-
trine's demand that courts not be accomplices in
the willful disobedience of a constitution they are
bound to uphold." Oaks stresses "the impropriety
of the lawgiver's forbidding conduct on the one
hand and at the same time participating in the
forbidden conduct by acquiring and using the
resulting evidence. 4 2 He labels this justification as
nomative andjuxtaposes it to thefactualjustification
of deterrence, thus giving exclusion a two-pronged
rationale.4 3 Commentators invariably include the
judicial integrity rationale in their discussions of
exclusion. The difficulty with these commentators
is their almost inevitable failure to probe the judi-
cial integrity rationale's relationship (or lack
37 Packer, supra note 16, at 16.
38Id. at 17.
39 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 at 470,
485 (1928) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ., dissenting)). The
Court's development of this doctrine in more recent cases
has departed from the reasoning of Clark, Packer, and
Elkins. See text accompanying notes 88-95 infra.
40 Comment, supra note 8, at 1133.
41 1 W. LaFave, supra note 5, at 17.
42 Oaks, supra note 3, at 668.
4.3 id.
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thereof) to the Constitution and to examine its
relevancy to the structure of government and the
separation of powers.44
In order better to understand certain difficulties
of the judicial integrity rationale, it is necessary to
examine the dissenting opinion of'Justice Brandeis
in Olmstead v. United States,4 5 an opinion often iden-
tified with the origins of the judicial integrity
argument. In referring to exclusion of evidence
gained by unlawful actions of government officers,
Brandeis stated: "And if this Court should permit
the Government, by means of its officers' crimes,
to effect its purpose of punishing the defendants,
there would seem to be present all the elements of
a ratification. If so, the government itself would
become a lawbreaker., 46 This statement would
seem to open the way for a profound discussion of
judicial review and the relationship between the
executive and judicial branches of government.
While Holmes refers to this relationship in his
companion dissenting opinion,47 Brandeis's opin-
ion does not follow this potentially fruitful line of
inquiry. He instead pursued two different catego-
ries of justifications for exclusion.
First, Brandeis argued that exclusion "preserve[s]
the judicial process from contamination. " 48 Ac-
cording to this rationale, a court preserves its un-
blemished nature by keeping its official actions
beyond reproach.4 9 The argument is that admission
of illegally seized evidence implies judicial ap-
proval of the illegal conduct and, in effect, makes
the Court an accomplice to such conduct.
Second, as two commentators have recognized,
the preservation of an untarnished character is an
end in itself, but those articulating the judicial
integrity rationale seem "driven to augment the
appeal for rectitude as an end with an appeal for
rectitude as a means-a means to avoid setting
'contagious' examples of lawlessness." 5 ForJustice
Brandeis, the rectitude he speaks of is a means to
these posited ends: "to maintain respect for law"
and "to promote confidence in the administration
of justice."5' Schrock and Welsh identify a weak-
4 Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary
Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251
(1974), is a notable exception to this statement.
45 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928).46 Id. at 483 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).47 Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
49 Comment, supra note 8, at 1133.
o Schrock & Welsh, supra note 44, at 265.
5' 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
ness of the integrity rationale understood as an end
in itself, for "it asks us to be guided by what seems
like judicial squeamishness" and such judicial
squeamishness is not likely to prevail against ar-
guments based on fear and other deeply rooted
human responses to crime.
52
There are other reasons that Brandeis' judicial
integrity as an end in itself will not prevail in
subsequent application of the exclusionary rule.
Although the judicial integrity argument has an
intuitively satisfying ring (especially to liberals),
the argument loses much of its persuasiveness if
exclusion is neither an implicit nor an explicit
constitutional requirement. If no standard other
than a self-enforced judicial sensitivity requires
exclusion, then one may raise profound questions
about the legitimacy ofjudicial enforcement of this
subjective sense of integrity. Why should the coun-
try suffer possible bad consequences of a doctrine
having no articulated constitutional foundation?
The assertion ofjudicial integrity as an end in itself
is incomplete. Without a sustained and careful
explanation going beyond the arguments of Bran-
deis, the judicial integrity argument is reduced to
a shallow defense which gives way-both in fact
and in theory-to other considerations.53
Brandeis' opinion leads to another element of
Clark's and Packer's analyses, that of maintaining
trust in government. Clark states that if too many
Americans believe government does not obey the
law and if they do not trust the police-"then there
is trouble."' In such a regime where trust in
government is lost, the ruling principles become
those of force and fear with an accompanying
denial of freedom. Unenforced constitutional rights
reflect a society which is lawless. The word of the
law must be fulfilled if "our people are to respect
the law. ' ' 5 Clark sees the fidelity of government to
its lawful role as necessary to restore trust in gov-
ernment, especially the trust of its young people
who have restless doubts about whether or not
America's government intends to do justice.56
Packer's due process model pursues a similar line
52 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 44, at 265-66.
5 Brandeis's argument, of course, was not intended to
be of constitutional dimension. 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the failure to anchor his
opinion in either constitutional or statutory foundations
leaves Brandeis open to the criticisms treated in the text
accompanying notes 54-70 & 84-85 infra.
5 R. CLARK, supra note 12, at 151.
Id. at 206.
56 Id. at 116.
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of argument. He recognizes a sense of injustice
which is aroused as the judicial process reveals
deprivations of specific constitutional rights. More
specifically, he states that judicial castigation of
police or prosecutorial conduct accompanied by a
failure to reverse a conviction "simply breeds dis-
respect for the very standards it is trying to af-
firm."
5 7
Brandeis pursued exclusion's necessary role in
maintaining trust in government when he turned
to effects of exclusion to undergird his judicial in-
tegrity argument. Lacking a constitutional basis
for judicial integrity as an end in itself, Brandeis
posits two desirable effects of exclusion: the main-
tenance of respect for law and the promotion of
confidence in the administration of justice. These
familiar strands of the liberal credo, previously
labeled "trust in government," are contained in the
much quoted passage:
If the Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the end
justifies the means-to declare that the Government
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction
of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribu-
tion. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court
should resolutely set its face.'
As Brandeis moves from the assertion of a "contam-
ination" theory of exclusion to the ends he posits
as effects of exclusion, his opinion assumes at least
arguable merit, but still contains no evident consti-
tutional basis for exclusion.
The controversy, as outlined by the quoted opin-
ion of Brandeis, suffers from two defects. First, it is
not explicitly or implicitly of constitutional origin;
it is an argument based on policy considerations,
considerations which are evident in the liberal
credo articulated by Clark and Packer. Second, the
argument does not resolve the question of exclu-
sion. As Schrock and Welsh emphasize, "If propo-
nents of the exclusionary rule say judicial lawless-
ness is a societal menace, the rejoinder is, why not
risk that menace rather than the far worse danger
of lawlessness in the streets?" 59 Lacking a consti-
tutional basis for his argument, Brandeis turns to
the justification of liberal policy considerations.
These liberal policy considerations, cf course, have
conservative rejoinders. As a consequence, one
57 Packer, supra note 16, at 55.
8 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
59 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 44, at 266.
would expect that a subsequent court would do
one of several things. It may try to establish a
substantial constitutional foundation for the rule
which would give it both legitimacy and conclu-
siveness. Or, it may move to some other potentially
conclusive factor(s) to resolve the controversy. Or,
the question of exclusion might simply become one
which is subtly dependent on changing personnel
within the Supreme Court of the United States:
when a liberal majority dominates, exclusion will
prevail; when a conservative majority dominates,
anti-exclusionary decisions will prevail. A sys-
tematic and thorough investigation of the caselaw
is not necessary in order to trace the path of the
judicial integrity argument and its transformation.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to examine certain doc-
trinal descendants of Olmstead in order to under-
stand the importance and contemporary status of
the judicial integrity rationale.
The argument articulated by Brandeis in Olin-
stead was adopted by the Court in McNabb v. United
States.60 Frankfurter's opinion for the Court empha-
sized that "[q]uite apart from the Constitution,...
we are constrained to hold that the evidence elic-
ited from the petitioners in the circumstances dis-
closed here must be excluded. For in their treat-
ment of the petitioners the arresting officers as-
sumed functions which Congress has explicitly de-
nied them."' Frankfurter required exclusion in
this instance not because of a constitutional viola-
tion, but because of the "flagrant disregard of the
procedure which Congress has commanded." His
objection to admitting as evidence statements
made in illegal circumstances rested on two bases:
it would make the courts "accomplices in willful
disobedience of law" and it would "stultify the
policy which Congress has enacted into law." 62 The
first basis seems to point toward the judicial integ-
rity argument. If so, it suffers from the various
defects which were articulated earlier. The second
basis-the stultifying of Congressional policy-
leads toward a more substantive argument. But
Frankfurter does not go beyond asserting that the
avoidance of such stultification requires the judi-
ciary to exclude evidence. Unfortunately, Elkins v.
United States,0 the case first invoking the term "the
imperative of judicial integrity," left the matter at
the citing and quoting of Olmstead and McNabb and
thereby passed an opportunity to articulate a sub-
60 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
6' Id. at 341-42.
6 Id. at 345.
63 364 U.S. 206.
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stantive and meaningful alternative to the deter-
rence rationale on which it relied so heavily.
D. DETERRENCE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL POLICE
ACTION
Another aspect of Clark's liberal credo is its
insistence that the various actors within the crimi-
nal process avoid conduct in excess of their author-
ity.' The judiciary may perform an important role
in maintaining this limit. Professor Packer's due
process model reflects this precept by accepting a
substantial diminution in the efficiency of the crim-
inal process to prevent governmental oppression of
the individual and to preserve procedural regular-
ity.65 This strand of both liberalism and the due
process model clearly emerges in the exclusionary
rule controversy and is familiar as the posited
deterrent effect of exclusion.
Deterrence of police from illegal actions is the
factor most discussed in recent judicial opinions
and in literature supporting the liberal position of
exclusion. As articulated by an ACLU brief, the
exclusion of tainted evidence is "the only practical
way to prevent wholesale violations" of the fourth
amendment.66 Deterrence, rightly or wrongly, has
become the dispositive issue in recent cases decided
before the United States Supreme Court. 7
In light of the Court's recent concentration on
deterrence, it is ironic that the early cases of Weeks
v. United States6s and Boyd v. United States69 did not
explicitly refer to deterrence of unreasonable
searches and seizures. The thrust of the Weeks
opinion was toward rendering the fourth amend-
ment effective as a duty "obligatory upon all en-
trusted under our Federal system with the enforce-
ment of the laws." The Court emphasized that
failure to exclude evidence obtained by unreason-
able police action would effectively sanction such
proceedings and constitute "a manifest neglect if
not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the
Constitution, intended for the protection of the
people against such unauthorized action." 70
64 R. CLARK, supra note 12, at 116.
r Packer, supra note 16, at 15-18.
6 Respondent's Brief on Appeal at 18, In the Matter
of the Deportation Proceedings of Emma Sandoval, A 20
824 162 (United States Department of Justice, Board of
Immigration Appeals 1976).
67See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3
(1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 484 (1976); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
68 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
70 232 U.S. at 392-94.
The constitutional argument in Weeks is different
in kind from the considerations of deterrence which
appeared in the later case of Wolf v. Colorado.71 The
question under consideration in Wolf was this:
Does a conviction by a State court for a State offense
deny the "due process of law" required by the
Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence
that was admitted at the trial was obtained under
circumstances which would have rendered it inad-
missible in a prosecution for violation of a federal
law in a court of the United States because there
deemed [sic] to be an infraction of the Fourth
Amendment as applied in Weeks v. United
States... ?72
The Court held that "in a State court for a State
crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid
the admission of evidence obtained by an unrea-
sonable search and seizure." 73 Justice Frankfurter
did not regard admission of the unconstitutionally
seized evidence as affirmatively sanctioning viola-
tion of fourth amendment guarantees. Rather, he
viewed exclusion in the context of enforcing a basic
right, checking arbitrary conduct, and affording a
remedy against such conduct.74 These statements,
in conjunction with Frankfurter's interpretation of
Weeks, departed from the constitutional basis of the
rule in Weeks. Frankfurter did not regard the Weeks
rule as derivative from the explicit requirements of
the fourth amendment. Rather, he saw the Weeks
exclusionary rule as a matter of judicial implica-
tion. 75 This interpretation of Weeks, an interpreta-
tion which will not bear close scrutiny, set the stage
for Frankfurter's conclusion that while exclusion
may effectively deter unreasonable searches, "it is
not for this Court to condemn as falling below the
minimal standards assured by the Due Process
Clause a State's reliance upon other methods
which, if consistently enforced, would be equally
effective...."76
The dispositive argument of this policy oriented
opinion seems to be that the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause requires an effective deter-
rent. Wolf jeaves states free to determine whether
or not to suppress the fruits of unreasonable
searches and seizures, and presumably this decision
will depend on the state's judgment of exclusion's
effectiveness as a deterrent. Furthermore, Frank-
7 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
72 Id. at 25-26.
73 Id. at 33.
74 Id. at 28.75id.
76 Id. at 31.
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furter asserted that Weeks did not derive the re-
quirement of exclusion in federal proceedings from
the explicit mandates of the fourth amendment,
but rather as "a matter of judicial implication. '"77
Despite the ambiguity of this phrase, it is clear that
Wolfs focus on deterrence as a primary issue and
its characterization of Weeks introduced deterrence
as the pivotal concept in the debate over the merits
of exclusion.
Elkins v. United States78 subsequently required
exclusion as the only effective weapon available
"to compel respect for the constitutional guar-
anty."7' 9 The Court assumed the deterrent effect of
the rule and rejected the likelihood of proving
empirically either that the rule hampers law en-
forcement or that it deters lawless searches and
seizures. Nonetheless, it asserted that neither the
work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor
that of the federal courts has been hampered by
the suppression doctrine. Quoting from a Califor-
nia case, the Court further noted that "other rem-
edies have completely failed to secure compliance
with the constitutional provisions on the part of
police officers...."80
Absent alternative remedies, police continue to
violate the fourth amendment and courts are forced
to participate in the illegal conduct and effectively
"condone the lawless activities of law enforcement
officers." 8' The failure of these other measures thus
presents the need for the practicable alternative of
exclusion. In this context, exclusion emerges as a
practical measure. While use of the word "con-
done" hints at the judicial integrity rationale,
which the Court discusses at the conclusion of the
opinion, the context and logic in raising "consid-
erations of reason and experience" 82 indicate purely
pragmatic concerns.
The landmark case of Mapp v. Ohios3 invoked
"judicial integrity" in the context of applying the
exclusionary rule to the states through the four-
teenth amendment. Although judicial integrity is
important to the constitutional (as opposed to deter-
rence) considerations, the Court devoted almost no
effort to justifying the consideration of judicial
integrity. It merely quotes the now familiar words
of Brandeis that failure to exclude the evidence in
77 id.
78 364 U.S. 206.
79Id. at 217.
80 Id. at 220 (quoting People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
445-47, 282 P.2d 905, 911-13 (1955)).
81 Id.
"2 364 U.S. at 222.
8" 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
question would invite anarchy.s4 It is highly prob-
lematic for Mapp to have regarded judicial integrity
as a plank in its constitutional considerations be-
cause in Olmstead Brandeis clearly regarded it
"[i]ndependently of the constitutional question. ' ' s
Transforming his words to considerations of a con-
stitutional nature certainly requires of the Court
some persuasive explanation of the link between
the Constitution and exclusion. Furthermore, al-
though the Court took pains to emphasize that the
factual grounds underlying exclusion are irrelevant
to determining whether or not exclusion is consti-
tutionally required,8' several pages of the opinion
are devoted to deterrence wherein the Court stated
"that the purpose of the exclusionary rule 'is to
deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it.' ,87
The role of judicial integrity as a pivotal consti-
tutional factor was short-lived. In refusing to give
retroactive effect to Mapp, the Court stated in
Linkletter v. Walkerss
Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of
the Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the
exclusionary rule within its rights. This, it was found,
was the only effective deterrent to lawless police
action. Indeed, all of the cases since Wolf requiring
the exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on
the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal
police action.s9
This statement seems clear enough, even if one
disagrees with the unequivocal cast of Linkletter's
interpretation of previous cases. The comer had
been turned, and in Linkletter deterrence became
the dispositive consideration in the exclusion con-
troversy. Unfortunately, Linkletter's reading of
Mapp's prime purpose as that of deterrence seem-
ingly freed the Linkletter Court from any obligation
to examine the theoretical foundations of deter-
rence; the Court seemed to assume this had been
done in Mapp. As we have seen, it had not. Dispel-
ling any doubt as to the moribund status of the
judicial integrity argument, the Court, in United
States v. Calandra,so clearly underscored the deter-
rence rationale for exclusion in ruling that a grand
84 Id. at 659.
85 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
so367 U.S. at 651, 653.
87 Id. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
at 217).
s'381 U.S. 618 (1965).
89 Id. at 636-37.
90414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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jury witness may not refuse to answer questions on
the grounds that they are based on evidence ob-
tained from an unlawful search and seizure. The
Court characterized the exclusionary rule as "a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitu-
tional right of the party aggrieved."9' One may
lament, with Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Mar-
shall who dissented, the Court's rejection of "the
imperative of judicial integrity" in Calandra. Yet,
such rejection is understandable given the failure
of previous efforts (and that of Brennan and his
fellow dissenters) to provide a persuasive and prin-
cipled constitutional foundation for the doctrine of
exclusion.n
The Court's reliance on deterrence as the sole
consideration is reinforced by other recent cases.
United States v. Janis93 held that the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule does not forbid the use in
a federal civil proceeding of evidence seized uncon-
stitutionally, but in good faith by a state officer.
The Court emphasized the role of deterrence in
decidingJanis: "If, on the other hand, the exclu-
sionary rule does not result in appreciable deter-
rence, then, clearly, its use in the instant situation
is unwarranted.9'' In a remarkable transformation
of the concept of judicial integrity to a position
derived from deterrence, the Court indicated that
maintaining judicial integrity is coincident with
determining the efficacy of exclusion as a deterrent
in the case being adjudicated.95 Thus, for a major-
ity of the Court, deterrence has become not only
the primary consideration in exclusion, but the
basis on which judicial integrity is defined as well.9
9 Id. at 348.
92 Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas & Mar-
shall, JJ., dissenting).
93 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
9 Id. at 454.
95 Id. at 458-59 n.35.
96 Other cases need not be analyzed in order to support
the argument that deterrence is the dispositive question
in the Court's treatment of fourth amendment exclusion.
The current state of the caselaw necessitates examination
of the empirical studies of deterrence. A subsequent
section will be devoted to the empirical studies both
because of their volume and because of the caselaw's
reliance on deterrence as the sole consideration governing
exclusion. Although I will argue later in my analysis that
deterrence should not be the dispositive consideration in
the exclusion controversy, the arguments and studies
relative to deterrence must be examined for a second
reason: the merits of the argument for exclusion which I
will later present can best be appreciated only in the
context of certain difficulties surrounding the deterrence
controversy. See section IV infra.
The predominant liberal arguments have been
distilled from scholarly commentary and the case-
law. These arguments have their theoretical foun-
dations in the liberal credo articulated by Ramsey
Clark and in the crime control model formulated
by Professor Packer. It was shown that while these
arguments have generally been well received in the
caselaw, there has not been an adequate basis laid
for this developmett in the Constitution itself.
Resolution of the problem of exclusion increasingly
revolves around the policy consideration of deter-
rence. Exclusion as necessary to the maintenance
of trust in government is no longer an important
consideration since it has been relegated to a posi-
tion dependent on the Court's assessment of deter-
rence potential in a particular factual context. The
role of exclusion in spelling out the contours of the
fourth amendment has never assumed an impor-
tant role in the caselaw. Thus, while the Court has
in general resolved the question of exclusion in a
manner consistent with the liberal credo and the
due process model, this resolution has increasingly
relied on only one of the considerations drawn from
these sources, that of deterrence.
III. CONSERVATIVES, THE CRIME CONTROL MODEL,
AND ExcLUSION
A. THE CONSERVATIVE CREDO AND PACKER'S CRIME
CONTROL MODEL
It is appropriate to draw a conservative perspec-
tive on crime primarily from those who are iden-
tified with a law and order perspective on the
criminal process. Several planks of the conservative
credo therefore will be drawn from former Presi-
dent Richard Nixon and his Attorney General,
John Mitchell. The foundations of this position are
well represented in a six-thousand-word position
paper Mr. Nixon prepared during the 1968 presi-
dential campaign. He entitled this document, "To-
ward Freedom From Fear."97 The paper is directed
toward drastically reducing crime in America, re-
storing safety to the streets, and removing from the
nation the stigma of a lawless society. He strongly
urges strengthening law enforcement machinery
and attacks Supreme Court decisions which inter-
fere with successful enforcement and prosecution.
In his words, "some of our courts have gone too far
in weakening the peace forces as against the crim-
inal forces." He specifically refers to Escobedo v.
97 R. Nixon, Toward Freedom from Fear, quoted in N.Y.
Times, May 9, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
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Illinois9 s and Miranda v. Arizona9 as nearly preclud-
ing confessions as a tool in law enforcement and
prosecution. He accuses the Johnson administra-
tion of grossly exaggerating the role of poverty in
causing crime. In Nixon's view, a doubling of the
conviction rate-from the roughly one arrest in
eight that results in conviction-would be more
effective in eliminating crime than would a quad-
rupling of funds in the war on poverty."
Another explicit theme of the conservative credo
is in the very title of Mr. Nixon's 1968 campaign
position paper, "Toward Freedom From Fear."
This thesis is persistent in the public statements of
both Mr. Nixon and John Mitchell. Speaking as
Attorney General of the United States in 1969,
Mitchell stated: "Fear of crime-by the housewife
and the school child, by merchant and the la-
borer-fear is forcing us, a free people, to alter our
pattern of life, especially after sundown."'
0
'
Whereas liberals perceive the threat to individual
security and liberty coming from the state, the
predominant conservative concern is of the crimi-
nal's undermining the peace of the political order.
According to the conservative argument, then, fear
of crime and the resulting insecurity are basic
threats to civil society, threats which demand that
overcoming lawlessness in America be elevated to
a top priority. In contrast to Ramsey Clark's ex-
hortation to deemphasize fear,1°2 the conservative
credo seeks to defuse this fear by eradicating crime
in the streets.
The conservatives thus emphasize the necessity
of meting out punishment to the guilty. President
Nixon illustrates this strand of the conservative
credo in his statement that "[w]hen we fail to make
the criminal pay for his crime, we encourage him
to think that crime will pay. ' 's °3 According to this
view, punishment is essential to reduce the incen-
tives for criminal conduct and to maintain respect
for the law. The conservative credo also exhibits
98 378 U.S. 478 (1964), cited in R. Nixon, supra note 97.
99 384 U.S. 436 (1966), cited in R. Nixon, supra note 97.
l03 R. Nixon, supra note 97, at 32, cols. 7-8.
101 Address by Attorney General John Mitchell, Deliv-
ered at Conference on Crime and the Urban Crisis of the
National Emergency Committee of the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, San Francisco, Calif. (Feb.
3, 1969), quoted in 35 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 290
(1969).
I- See text accompanying note 14 supra.
103 Address by President Richard M. Nixon, Delivered
on Nationwide Radio Prior to Transmitting to the Con-
gress the Sixth in a Series of State of the Union Messages,
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 10, 1973), quoted in 39 VITAL
SPEECHES OF THE DAY 354 (1973).
an implicit trust in the police premised on a con-
viction that the officer is a well-trained, well-in-
tended, and competent individual. Having daily
contact with the criminal element, the police are
viewed as better able to understand the necessities
of law enforcement than judges and other partici-
pants in the criminal process. Former President
Nixon expresses the matter in this way: "The time
has come for soft-headed judges and probation
officers to show as much concern for the rights of
innocent victims of crime as they do for the rights
of convicted criminals.'
1 ' 4
As sketched above, the conservative credo is
implicit in Professor Packer's crime control model.
This model is in many respects simply a more
comprehensive and theoretical articulation of the
conservative position on crime. It is anchored in
the proposition that repression of criminal conduct
is the most important function of the criminal
process, a status conferred in deference to the belief
that unbridled criminal conduct will erode public
order and thereby undermine an important con-
dition of freedom. As the "positive guarantor of
social freedom" for the ordinary citizen, the system
must be highly efficient in apprehending and dis-
posing of a high number of criminal offenders.
Recognizing the limited resources available to ac-
complish this important task, the model empha-
sizes both speed and finality. Speed necessitates
informality and uniformity, and finality requires
minimizing the occasions for challenge. The model
also leads to dependency on police interrogation,
extrajudicial processes, and other informal opera-
tions.1
0 5
The presumption of guilt informs a number of
tenets of the crime control model. It supposes that
the screening process of police and prosecutors are
reliable indicators of probable guilt and places
great confidence in the police and the early stages
of the criminal process. This tenet is not simply the
opposite of the presumption of innocence which
informs the due process model. The latter pre-
sumption is a kind of directive to authorities to
ignore the factual probabilities in their treatment
of the suspect. The presumption of innocence is
normative and legal; the presumption of guilt is
descriptive and factual. The crime control model
views the formal adjudicatory process as less likely
to produce reliable factfinding than the preceding
expert administrative process. It will tolerate rules
that forbid illegal arrests, searches, interrogations
i'4Id. at 355.
105 Packer, supra note 16, at 9-10.
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and the like, if enforcement of these prohibitions is
left primarily to internal administrative sanctions
rather than, as in the case of exclusion, to the less
efficient formal process.
The conservative credo and the crime control
model provide a useful theoretical backdrop for the
various criticisms of the exclusionary rule. The
criticisms discussed in the following sections are
drawn both from secondary literature and the case-
law.
B. EXCLUSION FREES CRIMINALS AND FAILS TO DETER
The most obvious and frequently articulated
objection to the exclusionary rule is that it frees
criminals who would otherwise be convicted on the
basis of trustworthy evidence. John Mitchell asserts
that acquittal of the guilty affects not only "a
vague amorphous group called society," but dam-
ages us individually because that freed criminal
"may assault or mug you."' 6 Professor Packer's
crime control model enumerates a similar objection
that failure to apprehend and convict encourages
a "general disregard for legal controls."'0 7 The
secondary literature on exclusion generally agrees
with Kaplan's common sense observation that
"[u]ndeniably, the exclusionary rule allows some
criminals to escape punishment."'' 8 One commen-
tator laments that the only parties protected by
operation of the exclusionary rule are the guilty.
The public is the loser because it must accept less
than the truth in the criminal case and suffer the
release of factually guilty criminals; the erring
police officer is not punished.0'9 Stated somewhat
differently, "[t]he most troublesome aspect of the
rule is its direct suppression of the truth.""' This
argument takes on added force when fourth
amendment violations are contrasted with matters
such as inherently unreliable coerced confessions
obtained in violation of the fifth amendment.
The additional major argument, that the rule
fails to deter unlawful police conduct, makes the
rule, in the view of critics such as Wingo, doubly
106 Address by Attorney General John Mitchell, 92d
Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, in
Dallas, Texas (Aug. 13, 1969), quotedin 35 VITAL SPEECHES
OF ThE DAY 678 (1969). A number of commentators have
advanced a similar position. See, e.g., Wright, Must the
Criminal Go Free If the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV.
7360(1972).
107 Packer, supra note 16, at 9.10 8 Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1027, 1034 (1974).109 Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary
Rule, 25 Sw. L. REV. 573, 576 (1971).
"o Id, at 583.
objectionable."' The reasons set forth to refute the
deterrence rationale are manifold. In general, the
core of these arguments is that exclusion lacks the
characteristics necessary to a successful deterrent.
More specifically, the rule operates directly against
the prosecutor, not the offending policeman." 2 A
second impediment to deterrence is potential police
concern with arrest and case clearances as opposed
to conviction." 3 In many cases involving gambling,
liquor, narcotics, and drug offenses, for example,
police may not even anticipate a final resolution of
trial and conviction." 4 Additionally, a policy of
deterrence cannot be effective against police who
have made an honest mistake in judgment with no
intentional erosion of the fourth amendment." 5
The rule's effectiveness as a deterrent is further
questionable on the grounds that it only excludes
evidence presented at one narrow stage of the
criminal process." 6 There is also evidence that
police rely on departmental standards favoring
arrest and conviction to justify their actions more
than on judicially formulated legal standards
which favor the rights of defendants." 7
The exoneration and failure to deter arguments
against exclusion have been widely recognized in
the caselaw. Perhaps the best known judicial ob-
jection to the exclusionary rule is that of Cardozo:
"The criminal is to go free because the constable
has blundered.""8 An early judicial recognition of
exclusion's freeing the criminal is Chief Justice
Taft's statement in Olmstead v. United States that
' A study in New York City shows an increase in
dismissal rates in narcotics cases because of motions to
suppress following Mapp v. Ohio. Note, Effect of Mapp v.
Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases,
4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87, 97 (1968). Oaks notes in
his analysis of motions to suppress, that "in every single
one of these cases in which a motion to suppress was
granted, the charges were then dismissed." Oaks, supra
note 3, at 746 (emphasis deleted).
112 Wingo, supra note 109, at 576, (citing Oaks, supra
note 3, at 726); S. SCHLESINGER, ExcLUsIONARY INJUSTICE:
THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 57-58
(1977).
113 LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Ex-
clusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and Local Court Prac-
tices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 447 (1965).
114 Id. at 429; Oaks, supra note 3, at 721-22.
5 Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REV.
565, 590 (1955).
116 S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 112, at 56.
1Id. at 57.
n8 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585,
587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926). This opinion is
quoted at length in Frankfurter's opinion for the Court,
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 31 n.2 (1949).
1980]
LANE V. SUNDERLAND
exclusion "would make society suffer and give
criminals greater immunity than has been known
heretofore."' 9 Justice Holmes responded in dis-
sent: "I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the Government should
play an ignoble part. 1 20 Neither Holmes nor Taft
advanced a constitutional argument to justify his
respective view, however. Stewart's opinion for the
Court in Elkins v. United States is sympathetic to the
freeing the guilty argument against exclusion, but
it wrongly assumes disposition of this objection by
recourse to the deterrence argument and rejection
of the rule as direct punishment to the offending
officer or remedy to the accused.
12
'
The court emphasized these themes in Linkletter
v. Walker, which decided that Mapp would not have
retrospective application. 22 First, positing the in-
tent of the exclusionary rule as deterrence, the
Court stated that the purpose of deterrence would
not "be advanced by making the rule retrospec-
tive,' '1 s and such retrospective application of the
exclusionary rule would result in the release of
prisoners who had been found guilty of crime. The
Court added that reparation comes too late to
restore the "ruptured privacy of the victims' homes
and effects."'
24
The most extensive critique of exclusion appears
in Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Biv-
ens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.' 2' Bivens allowed
an action for damage under the fourth amendment
where, without a warrant, law enforcement agents
entered petitioner's apartment, searched it, and
arrested him. Burger's dissent is laced with refer-
ences to the rule's freeing criminals. In one instance
he refers to "thousands of cases in which the crim-
inal was set free because the constable
blundered."" 6 He premised his opinion on the
proposition that the cost to society of releasing
guilty criminals mandates that the rule clearly
demonstrate its effectiveness. Far from meeting this
burden of proof, proponents of the rule can claim
'no empirical evidence to support the claim that
the rule actually deters illegal conduct of law en-
"9 277 U.S. 438, 468 (1928). Olmstead, of course, did
not involve a constitutional violation, but action that was
a misdemeanor under the law of Washington. Id. at 466.
'2 Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12' Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216-17
(1960).
122381 U.S. 618.
"a Id. at 637.]? id.
125 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
126 Id. at 424 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
forcement officers." 12 7 Citing Oaks, Burger empha-
sized that the rule applies no direct sanction to the
officer who committed the unreasonable search or
seizure. The rule's immediate effect is upon the
prosecutor whose case against the defendant is
weakened or destroyed."' Burger particularly ob-
jected to the view of law enforcement as a "mono-
lithic governmental enterprise" which leads to the
erroneous assumption that a mediate effect on
police will result from the disappointed prosecu-
tor's corrective instructions to the police. 12 Re-
sponding to Burger's charge that exclusion does
not directly sanction the individual officer, An-
thony Amsterdam writes that exclusion is not sup-
posed to deter us the same way as does the law of
larceny, "by threatening punishment to him who
steals a television set-a theory of deterrence, by
the way, whose lack of empirical justification makes
the exclusionary rule look as solid by comparison
as the law of gravity."' 130 Amsterdam sees the ex-
clusionary rule rather as analogous to branding the
purchaser's social security number into the chassis
of new television sets. By reducing the resale value
to anyone but the true owner, branding lessens the
likelihood of theft. On the other hand, Amsterdam
writes that without the exclusionary rule the crim-
inal court system "is the equivalent of a govern-
ment purchasing agent paying premium prices for
evidence branded with the stamp of unconstitu-
tionality.' 3' The subtlety of the type of deterrence
associated with exclusion compounds the problem
of empirically establishing it. But too often, Am-
sterdam tells us, the suppression doctrine is dis-
cussed as if it were an "instrument for 'deterring'
discrete and specific episodes of unconstitutional
police behavior."'
32
Dallin Oaks, drawing on the work of Johannes
Andenaes, Herbert Packer, and Franklin Zimring,
identifies three indirect and long range effects
which are relevant to the deterrent effect of exclu-
sion and the Chief Justice's objection.l3 The first
127 Id. at 416. Oaks acknowledges that an officer may
experience disappointment at seeing evidence suppressed
and an offender go free, and that this may influence the
officer's future behavior. However, he would be much
more confident of a deterrent if some individual sanction
such as departmental discipline were coupled with exclu-
sion. Oaks, supra note 3, at 710.
128 403 U.S. at 416 (citing Oaks, supra note 3).
'
29Id. at 416-17.
'30 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 431 (1974).
131 Id. at 431-32.
132Id. at 432.
133 Oaks, supra note 3, at 711 (citing Andenaes, Does
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of these is the "moral or educative influence" of
the law. Society's official branding of an act as
reprehensible may influence attitudes apart from
the fear of sanctions. According to this theory,
exclusion's visible expression of social disapproval
of fourth amendment violations may affect society
at large, including law enforcement officials, by
visibly expressing social disapproval of fourth
amendment violations. Exclusion underscores the
importance attached to observing fourth amend-
ment guarantees and thereby attaches more credi-
bility to them. 34 To paraphrase Zimring, exclu-
sion's reinforcement of the Constitution's solemn
commands makes clear that the Constitution
means what it says.'
35
Oaks identifies two additional indirect effects of
legal punishment in general which likewise may
attend exclusion. A threat of punishment helps in
developing "habits of conforming behavior that
continue to influence an individual's conduct long
after he has ceased to weigh the pros and cons of
observance."1 36 Such sanctions may also provide a
potential offender who is disposed to observe the
rules an additional reason for doing so.1 3 7 The
benefit of these indirect effects would seem limited
to routine police behavior rather than behavior
calling for extremely complex applications of the
fourth amendment doctrine which might divide an
appellate court in subsequent adjudications. Fur-
thermore, the critic of the second of these subtle
arguments may respond by citing the Chief Jus-
tice's argument in Bivens.138 If the individual officer
does not perceive exclusion as a personal sanction,
it seems unlikely that exclusion will influence the
officer's conduct "long after he has ceased to weigh
the pros and cons of observance."1 39 On the other
hand, the educative and reinforcing effects of ex-
clusion are not so clearly dependent on the officer's
perception of suppression as a personal threat. If
the theories Oaks presents are otherwise sound, the
Chief Justice's reservation is not such a formidable
one.
A related criticism leveled by the Chief Justice
Punishment Deter Crime?, I1 CRIM. L.Q. 76, 80-81 (1968);
H. Packer, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCrION 42-45
(1968); F. Zimring, Perspectives on Deterrence (Center
for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, National Institute
of Mental Health, Monograph Series, 1970).
134 Oaks, supra note 3, at 711.
135 Zimring, supra note 133, at pt. I, § 3, quoted in Oaks,
supra note 3, at 711 n.129.
ISO aks, supra note 3, at 711.
13 7 Id. at 712.
'8 403 U.S. at 417 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
139 Oaks, supra note 3, at 711.
is that "[t]he suppression doctrine vaguely assumes
that law enforcement is a monolithic governmental
enterprise."'"4 Burger objects to the assumption
that there is sufficient prosecutorial supervision of
police to achieve deterrence by means of the frus-
trated prosecutor's control of police. His separation
of police and prosecution is understandable in the
context of deterrence. It is ironic, however, that he
objects to viewing the government and the individ-
ual policeman as a monolith, for this view will
certainly lead to a trichotomy of government into
insular branches, none of which forms a part of an
organic whole. Indeed, the very approach Burger
takes in Bivens points to an atomistic conception of
government departing from the view that the ju-
diciary, the legislature, and all parts of the execu-
tive are ultimately engaged in the same enter-
prise-that of governing according to the grants of
and limitations on power set forth in the Consti-
tution. Addressing this somewhat heretical view of
constitutional government, Anthony Amsterdam
writes that "it is unreal to treat the offending
officer as a private malefactor who just happens to
receive a government paycheck. It is the govern-
ment that sends him out on the streets with the job
of repressing crime and of gathering criminal evi-
dence in order to repress it.
14
'
'40 403 U.S. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
141 Amsterdam, supra note 130, at 432. Amsterdam
recognizes a weakness in Burger's formulation of the
exclusionary controversy which, on its face, appears to be
very damaging. It is surprising that after offering this
insight, Amsterdam backs away from one direction in
which the argument might lead:
I am not suggesting that the exclusionary rule is
an explicit command of the Constitution, nor do I
mean to make more of the fourth amendment's
language than the skin of the living thought that
dwells within. The rule was fashioned by judges as
an expression of that thought. What the Constitu-
tion does command is that the administration of the
system of criminal justice be so ordered as not to
provide incentives toward unreasonable search and
seizure which it is not fully capable of restraining:
Unless and until a far better system of restraints is
devised and put into effective operation than we
now have or can soon anticipate, the exclusionary
sanction is the only way to honor that command.
Id. at 433 (footnotes omitted). Amsterdam is an articulate
and perceptive analyst of the fourth amendment. It is
remarkable, given the thrust of this argument which
favors the exclusionary rule and rejects Burger's atomistic
division of government, that there is so little difference
between the positions the two take on exclusion. While
neither the validity nor the source of Amsterdam's prop-
osition that the Constitution commands the criminal
justice system be ordered so as "not to produce incentives
toward unreasonable search and seizure which it is not
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Chief Justice Burger's critique of exclusion in
Bivens includes a two-pronged attack on the rule
which casts doubts on its educational effect. First,
police officers "do not have the time, inclination,
or training to read and grasp the nuances of the
appellate opinions that ultimately define the
standards of conduct they are to follow."' Burger
properly recognized that these appellate opinions,
often the product of divided courts, frequently lack
helpful clarity in determining the reasonable
bounds of search and seizure. These problems are
compounded by the fact that search and seizure
cases often raise questions which admit neither of
easy nor obvious answers. A related problem is the
diminution of any possible educational effect by
the long time lapse between the challenged police
action and its final judicial resolution. Burger re-
garded it as unlikely that the police officer would
ever become aware of the final result after such a
delay. He also saw the application of the exclusion-
ary rule both to honest police mistakes and delib-
erate and flagrant Irvine-type violations as objec-
tionable-a "single, monolithic, and drastic judi-
cial response to all official violations of legal
norms."'
43 These arguments reduce to the single
proposition that judicial interpretations of the
fourth amendment are simply too complex and
delayed to expect police comprehension and obe-
dience. This difficulty is compounded by the na-
ture and timing of the appellate process. A number
of commentators have addressed this objection
which confuses the exclusionary doctrine with the
substance of fourth amendment prohibitions. More
than forty years ago Senator Robert Wagner noted
that exclusion is only the sanction which renders
the fourth amendment effective. He cautioned that
"[i]t is the rule [i.e., the fourth amendment], not
the sanction, which imposes limits on the operation
of the police. If the rule is obeyed as it should be,
... there will be no illegally obtained evidence to
fully capable of restraining," are clear, his conclusion is.
Amsterdam favors the exclusionary sanction, but only
because a practical and effective alternative is unavaila-
ble. Thus there are great similarities between Burger and
Amsterdam's conclusions despite their different views of
government. Amsterdam wants to retain exclusion until
a better restraint is devised and effected; Burger, while
opposing the exclusionary rule as ineffective, does not
favor abandoning it until some meaningful alternative is
developed.
142 403 U.S. at 417 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 418. For a discussion of one resolution of this
problem, see Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Require-
ment of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRlia. L. & C. 141,
150-59 (1978).
be excluded by the operation of the sanction."'
'
"
Additionally, Yale Kamisar recognizes a more fun-
damental problem implicit in Burger's objections.
Kamisar writes that,
if the officer, as Dean Griswold described it, acted in
the manner that "a good, careful, conscientious po-
lice officer" is expected to act, or if, as Judge Friendly
maintained in Soyka, the officer's error was "so min-
iscule and pardonable as to render the drastic sanc-
tion of exclusion ... almost grotesquely inappro-
priate," then the error should not render the search
or seizure "unreasonable" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment-as the Second Circuit held on
rehearing en banc in Soyka.... After all, probable
cause is supposed to turn on "the factual and prac-
tical considerations of everday life on which reason-
able and prudent men, not legal technicians, act,"
... and affidavits are supposed to be interpreted in
a "commonsense" rather than a "hyper-technical"
145
manner....
Burger's criticisms of the complexity of fourth
amendment law which he directs at exclusion may
well have merit. The above commentators make
clear, however, that they are misdirected.
Burger's criticisms raise questions not only about
the substance of fourth amendment law, but about
the judicial process and the proper mode of consti-
tutional interpretation as well. These are questions
of interest which should be addressed by commen-
tators and judges, but it is unfortunate that they
arise in a context which obscures the issue of exclu-
sion. As Professor LaFave points out, ineffective
communication of and lack of clarity in fourth
amendment rules is not sufficient reason for aban-
doning the exclusionary rule. Nor do these criti-
cisms address the desire for effecting and minimiz-
ing "the risks of inadvertent and unintentional
police violations of the... Fourth Amendment.',
4
6
LaFave states: "To suggest that this objective
would somehow vanish if the exclusionary rule
were abandoned is to concede the force of the
warning in Weeks v. United States that without the
144 RECORD OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 559-60 (1938), quoted in Allen, The Wolf Case:
Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL.
L. REV. 1, 19 n.56 (1954). See also Kamisar, Mondale on
Mapp, 1977 Civ. LIB. REV. 62, cited and quoted in Kamisar,
Is the Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, 62 JUDICATURE 66, 70-71 &
n.22 (1978) [hereinafter Kamisar (1978)1; Mondale, The
Problem of Search and Seizure, 19 BENCH & B. MINN. 15, 16
(1962).
14s Kamisar (1978), supra note 144, at 84 n. 112 (cita-
tions omitted).
146 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 25.
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suppression doctrine the Fourth Amendment
would be no more than a 'form of words.' "147 In
other words, abolition or retention of the exclusion-
ary rule should be undertaken independently of
difficulties related to substantive fourth amend-
ment considerations.
A final criticism leveled by the Chief Justice is
that there are important police activities which do
not result in criminal prosecutions and "the rule
has virtually no applicability and no effect in such
situations."'48 According to this line of argument,
exclusion is not likely to achieve deterrence in those
areas of police activity that do not result in prose-
cution or which are not directed toward acquiring
evidence. Only a small portion of police behavior
is directed toward such ends. Although Burger's
argument may have merit when police officers are
consciously weighing the pros and the cons of
misconduct, certain indirect deterrent effects which
Oaks identifies do not necessarily succumb to
Burger's criticism. 49
Objections that exclusion frees criminals coupled
with reservations regarding its deterrent effect ap-
pear in majority opinions subsequent to Bivens.
More important than the explicit statements in
United States v. Janis is the Court's decision not to
extend the rule to exclude from a federal civil
proceeding evidence seized unreasonably, but in
good faith, by a state law enforcement officer. The
Court in Stone v. Powell reiterated reservations about
the costs of exclusion in its statement that
"[a]pplication of the rule ... often frees the
guilty. ' 15° The criticism that exclusion frees the
guilty and fails to deter persists in the caselaw,
notwithstanding the responses of Wagner, LaFave,
and others.
C. EXCLUSION UNDERMINES JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
A second conservative criticism of exclusion is
that it interferes with justice, understood as finding
truth and punishing the guilty. According to this
view, such interference with justice in turn under-
mines the integrity of the judiciary and leads peo-
ple to lose respect for the criminal justice system.
Richard Nixon expresses the matter in his view
of society's relationship to the criminal: "Society is
guilty of crime only when we fail to bring the
criminal to justice."'151 His reference to "soft-
',7 Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383).
148 403 U.S..at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
149 Oaks, supra note 3, at 720.
1"o 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
"' Address by President Richard M. Nixon, supra note
103, at 354.
headed judges" likewise indicates a concern that
the real breach of integrity occurs when the system
impedes truthfinding and punishing the guilty.
1 2
This lack of integrity in the conservative sense is a
contributing cause to undermining trust in govern-
ment. Furthermore, the release of criminals
threatens to undermine the security and liberty of
the law abiding citizen. Thus, exclusion interferes
with the fundamental justification for govern:
ment-the maintenance of a secure arena in which
the ordinary citizen exercises his freedoms. Any-
thing interfering with meting out punishment to
the guilty will disrupt fundamental judicial func-
tions and thereby undermine trust in government.
Professor Packer's characterization of the crime
control model likewise leads to the conservative
claim that exclusion undermines judicial integrity
and trust in government. He states the crime con-
trol model's concern that "if it is perceived that
there is a high percentage of failure to apprehend
and convict in the criminal process, a general
disregard for legal controls tends to develop."'
153
Other elements of the crime control model are
likewise related to the conservative judicial integ-
rity and trust in government arguments. One of
these elements is the opposition to using thejudicial
process to correct errors in the application of the
rules relating to illegal arrests, unreasonable
searches, and other objectionable police practices.
Such use impairs the efficiency of the process by
interfering with the truthfinding function of courts
and impeding the apprehension and conviction of
criminals necessary to the maintenance of trust in
governmentT M
Dean Paulsen summarizes the conservative ju-
dicial integrity and respect for law arguments in
concise fashion: "The rule destroys respect for law
because it provides the spectacle of the courts
letting the guilty go free., 155 Coe stresses that ex-
clusion distorts the factfinding process, interferes
with a rational determination of guilt, and most
fundamentally, exacts a "high toll in terms of loss
of public respect for the judiciary, and for the law
itself.'
156
Only recently has the caselaw paid serious atten-
tion to these conservative arguments. Linkletter v.
Walker captures some of the flavor of the conserva-
tive judicial integrity argument. Noting the com-
'52 Id. at 355.
53 Packer, supra note 16, at 9.
s'Id. at 10, 18.1" Paulsen, supra note 30, at 256.
"5 Coe, The ALI Substantiality Test: A Flexible Approach
to the Exclusionary Sanction, 10 GA. L. REv. 1, 25 (1975).
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plicated evidentiary hearings that retroactive ap-
plication of Mapp would require, the Court stated
that "to thus legitimate such an extraordinary
procedural weapon that has no bearing on guilt
would seriously disrupt the administration of jus-
tice.' 5 7 This interpretation of judicial integrity
was adopted in Stone v. Powell,15 where the Court
emphasized the centrality of what it termed "the
ultimate question of guilt or innocence" in a crim-
inal proceeding. The Court objected to exclusion
in the context of Stone, partially because "[a]ppli-
cation of the rule thus deflects the truth-finding
process .... 159 It also expressed concern that indis-
criminate application of the exclusionary rule
might generate disrespect for the law and its ad-
ministration. Although not labeled a "judicial in-
tegrity" argument, the rationale in Stone closely
corresponds to the conservative version of the ju-
dicial integrity argument and marks a significant
step beyond previous recognition of the liberal
version of judicial integrity under the deterrence
rationale.
D. EXCLUSION IS A LEGAL TECHNICALITY WHICH
HANDCUFFS POLICE
The conservative credo articulates the additional
criticism that exclusion frees criminals on mere
technicalities. Like the conservative judicial integ-
rity argument, this criticism is implicit in Richard
Nixon's statement that judges are "soft-headed"
and more considerate of the criminal than of the
victim.'6 John Mitchell's Crime Legislation: What
Happened to Congress161 seeks to free the system of
such technicalities by proposing both a number of
bills to strengthen the enforcement tools of police
officers and measures such as allowing the admis-
sion of confessions obtained in a manner not strictly
adhering to Miranda requirements.
62
Professor Packer's crime control model develops
this criticism more systematically. Fundamentally,
the very definition of efficiency within the crime
control model is intolerant of "ceremonious rituals
that do not advance the progress of a case."' 6 This
model "accepts the probability of mistakes up to
'57 381 U.S. at 637-38.
'58 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
'5 Id. at 490.
'
60 Address by President Richard M. Nixon, supra note
103, at 355.161 Address by Attorney General John Mitchell, An-
nual Conference of United Press International Editors
& Publishers, Hamilton, Bermuda (October 6, 1969),
quoted in 36 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 39, 40 (1969).
162 Id.
163 Packer, supra note 16, at 10.
the level at which they interfere with the goal of
repressing crime." This acceptance of mistakes as-
sumes importance in instances in which they are
made in good faith.
The secondary literature and the caselaw treat
rather unsympathetically the objection that exclu-
sion handcuffs the police. Frequently discussion of
this criticism is coupled with discussion of other
factors such as the intrinsic difficulty police officers
experience in knowing what is and is not legal I6
and the public dissatisfaction resulting from the
release of the "guilty" in such contexts as warrant-
less searches incident to arrest.16S Generally speak-
ing, however, the argument has not elicited sus-
tained analysis from scholars and jurists.' One
l" One commentator voices his discontent against
the non-knowability of some of the technical rules
of constitutional interpretation. Policemen often in
good faith rely on their common sense judgment or
their not-so-common sense judgment bred of expe-
rience in the streets and they do what they do
without technical knowledge of the unconstitution-
ality of the acts prohibited.
Simon, Remarks before the 1972 Judicial Conference of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial
Circuit, in "The Exclusionary Rule," 61 F.R.D. 259, 274
(1972). See also Wingo, supra note 109, at 577; Wright,
supra note 107, at 740; Oaks, supra note 3, at 731.
The caselaw has paid little attention to the argument.
Treating the question in summary fashion, Justice Stew-
art's opinion for the Court in Elkinsv. United States referred
to the rule which had required exclusion in the federal
courts for nearly half a century. He noted that "it has
not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation has thereby been rendered ineffective, or
that the administration of criminal justice has thereby
been disrupted." 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960). His opinion,
in a footnote, also quotes an applicable section from the
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin:
Professional standards in law enforcement provide
for fighting crime with intelligence rather than
force .... In matters of scientific crime detection, the
services of our FBI Laboratory are available to every
duly constituted law enforcement officer in the na-
tion. Full use of these and other facilities should
make it entirely unnecessary for any officer to feel
the need to use dishonorable methods.
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Sept., 1952, at 1-2, quoted
in id. at 218 n.8.
165 Finzen, The Exclusionay Rule in Search and Seizure:
Examination and Prognosis, 20 KAN. L. REv. 768, 782 (1972).
This aspect of the legal technicalities and handcuffing
the police argument has direct application to the previous
section's treatment of the conservative version ofjudicial
integrity and its effects on public respect for the law. See
also, Kaplan, supra note 108, at 1035-36 & n.52.
"One exception to this statement is Inbau, Public
Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand, 53
J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 85, 86 (1962); Inbau, More About
Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 329, 332 (1962). The contention that the exclusion-
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reason the argument has not been taken with great
seriousness is that the statistical indications of in-
creased crime following the rule's adoption cannot
establish that the exclusionary rule causes more
crime. 67 Second, the argument is misdirected. As
Senator Robert F. Wagner observed many years
before the Mapp decision:
It seems to me inconsistent to challenge the exclu-
sionary rule on the ground that it will hamper the
police, while making no challenge to the fundamen-
tal rules to which the police are required to conform.
If these rules, defining the scope of the search which
may be made without a warrant and the scope of
the search under a warrant are sound, there is no
reason why they should be violated or why a prose-
cuting attorney should seek to avail himself of the
fruits of their violation.
163
As Professor Allen recognizes in the context of this
quotation from Wagner, if the courts have not
given appropriate consideration to the require-
ments of law enforcement, abolition of the exclu-
sionary rule will not solve the problem. Instead,
substantive fourth amendment rights should be
redefined."e
Professor Kaplan explains in stark terms reasons
for the high political cost of exclusion, which per-
sists despite the fact that exclusion is a function of
the interpretation given substantive constitutional
provisions:
[B]y definition, it operates only after incriminating
evidence has already been obtained. As a result, it
flaunts before us the costs we must pay for Fourth
Amendment guarantees. Where guarantees of indi-
vidual rights are actually obeyed by the police,
criminals are not discovered and thus no shocking
cases come to public consciousness. When we apply
the exclusionary rule, however, we know precisely
what we would have found had constitutional rights
been violated (because, of course, in these cases they
were violated), and we are forced to witness the full,
concrete price we pay for these guarantees.
1 70
As Kaplan recognizes, however, objections to the
exclusionary rule do not always rest on opposition
ary rule handcuffs the police "was very much in vogue
immediately after the Mapp decision." 1 W. LAFAvE,
supra note 5, at 22.
167 Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some
'Facts' and 'Theories,' 53 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 171 (1962).
Professor Kamisar demonstrates that these "crime wave"
statistics do not withstand careful scrutiny.
"s RECORD OF THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTmON 559-60 (1938).
169 Allen, supra note 144, at 19-20.
170 Kaplan, supra note 108, at 1037-38.
to substantive fourth amendment rules. There are
cases in which the criminal would have been
caught if the police had followed fourth amend-
ment requirements. In some cases, Kaplan points
out, "police have both the cause and opportunity
to get search warrants but fail to do so"; in other
instances, "police fail to knock appropriately before
making an otherwise legal search." He identifies
these as instances which constitute a clear windfall
to the criminal.17 ' Despite its price, Kaplan notes
that exclusion serves a vital function in focusing
judicial attention on the critical nature of the
fourth amendment. Exclusion also contributes to
the delineation of restrictions on law enforcement
in a context which focuses attention on the balance
which must be struck between effective law en-
forcement and the importance of fourth amend-
ment concerns to liberal democracy. It is difficult
to appreciate the observations Kaplan makes re-
garding the failure of police to obtain warrants
when they have both the cause and the opportunity
and the police's failure to knock before making an
otherwise legal search. One simply cannot dismiss
as a mere technicality failure to get a search war-
rant where there is cause and opportunity. No
matter how the fourth amendment or its history is
read, the warrant requirement is a fundamental
feature. The requirement of notice is also a signifi-
cant aspect of the law of search and seizure which
has roots some commentators trace to seventeenth
century England. As LaFave recognizes, even the
legislation creating the writs of assistance required
that notice be given before entry. 72 As early as
1813, American courts spoke of the necessity to
give notice in the execution of search warrants.'
73
Exceptions to this requirement when police act
reasonablj to prevent destruction or disposal of the
things named in the warrant can be subtle ones;
nonetheless, the requirement of notice is not a
recent, liberal innovation in the law of search and
seizure. Rather, the requirement has the support
of both history and, subject to exceptions, sound
policy considerations.
74
171 Id. at 1038.
172 LaFave traces the requirement to Semayne's Case, 5
Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603). 2 W. LAFAVE,
supra note 5, at 122.
173 Bell v. Clapp, 10 John's R. 263 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1813), cited in 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 123.
17 LaFave recognizes that "the United States Supreme
Court has not had occasion to rule specifically upon the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment compels that
notice ordinarily be given in the execution of a search
warrant." 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 123. The pur-
poses served by the notice requirement include" 'decreas-
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The complaint that the rule is a legal technical-
ity which handcuffs police is properly analyzable
along two different dimensions. The first pertains
to the nature of the substantive rules triggering
exclusion. As discussed above, such criticism should
properly be directed toward the substantive rules
themselves. The second dimension of this criticism
is that exclusion itself is a mere technicality which
actually interferes with the finding of truth and
the punishment of the guilty, even when the sub-
stantive fourth amendment rules which are in-
volved are reasonable ones. This second dimension
is more difficult to dispose of. At its foundation are
two assumptions regarding the criminal process.
First, it limits its consideration, for purposes of
exclusion at least, to the trial itself. The introduc-
tion of trustworthy evidence advances the truth-
finding process; exclusion is a technicality which
impedes this process. One difficulty with this view
is that the Constitution clearly takes a broader
view of the criminal process insofar as several pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights clearly relate to pre-
trial procedures. Thus, to narrow due process con-
siderations to factors affecting the truthfinding
function of the criminal trial ignores various safe-
guards which are specified in the Constitution as
part of liberal democracy. 75
More importantly, however, the view that exclu-
sion is a legal technicality must be examined in
light of the more fundamental question of whether
or not exclusion is a bona fide constitutional re-
quirement. While a persuasive argument that ex-
clusion is a constitutional right or a requirement of
constitutional principle may not change the posi-
tion of those who object to the wisdom of the
doctrine, one assumes it would change the charac-
ter of their objections to one of constitutional mag-
nitude.
E. ALTERNATIVE METHODS TO SPELL OUT THE
CONTOURS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A final conservative objection to the exclusionary
rule arises from the position that various effective
alternatives to exclusion are available which are
not ridden with the defects of exclusion. Although
certain authors also argue that their proposals pro-
vide an alternative means of spelling out the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment, characteristically
they do not give this factor serious treatment. In
ing the potential for violence,'" the " 'protection of pri-
vacy,"' and "'preventing the physical destruction of
property.' Note, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 140-42 (1970), quoted
in 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 5, at 124.
175 U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII.
general, the suggestions of alternatives to exclusion
stem from a composite of the various above-enu-
merated tenets of the conservative credoY76 These
arguments are reducible to the proposition that the
costs of exclusion are too high. These same reser-
vations about exclusion and the preference for
alternatives are also attributable to the crime con-
trol model. The crime control model, seeking to
maximize efficiency, puts high priorities on speed
and finality in the criminal process. The model
accepts the mistakes that do not interfere with the
repression of crime and insists that the guilty be
punished as quickly as possible. Even more directly
related to the development of alternatives, how-
ever, is the model's preference for extrajudicial over
judicial processes and the refusal to allow vindica-
tion of constitutional rules through the criminal
process itself.177
According to Professor Schlesinger the objectives
of alternatives to exclusion are "deterrence of police
misbehavior through identification and discipline
of offending official(s), a better system than we
have at present for compensating the innocent
victims of illegal searches and seizures, and convic-
tion of the guilty ....,,.78 He proposes two alterna-
tives which he believes meet these objectives. One
is an independent review board to work in con-
junction with the judiciary in punishing officers
guilty of illegal behavior. The second is a civil
remedy which would allow innocent victims a
means both of pointing out official misbehavior
and of collecting compensation for illegal searches
and seizures.
7 9
Schlesinger's discussion of his proposals fails to
demonstrate how they would serve to delineate the
fourth amendment's contours. It is difficult to con-
struct the means by which authoritative construc-
tion of fourth amendment rules would be accom-
plished within the rubric of the independent review
board he advocates1 ° This problem is not quite as
serious within the context of the civil remedy, for
even though he does not discuss the matter, stand-
ards would presumably be forthcoming from the
trial court and be appealable through regular
channels.18' Amsterdam, supported by Paulsen and
LaFave, has asserted that lawyers will be very
hesitant to take on such police cases because of the
investigative and litigative problems involved and
17- See text accompanying notes 97-106 supra.
177 Packer, supra note 16, at 10, 15, 17-18, 53.
178 S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 112, at 71.
79 Id. at 76-77. See also Mikva, Victimless Justice, 71 J.
CRIM. L & C. 184 (1980).
o S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 112, at 72.
18 See Oaks, supra note 3, at 705.
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because of the potential for developing an adver-
sary relationship with the police. 82 Quoting Am-
sterdam, LaFave writes:
"Where are the lawyers going to come from to
handle these cases for the plaintiffs?" One of the
great virtues of the exclusionary rule is that Fourth
Amendment violations are regularly brought to
light; the accused "has a motive to challenge the
police overreaching" and he "need not resort to
another proceeding or hire another lawyer." But
what "would possess a lawyer to file a claim for
damages ... in an ordinary search and seizure
case?'
18
Schlesinger believes this problem can be resolved
by providing free legal counsel under existing in-
stitutional arrangements for indigents who wish to
bring such an action. 184 If one could overcome
these objections and counsel were both forthcoming
and available, this would be an important step in
disposing of the objection that exclusion is the only
reliable means of spelling out the fourth amend-
ment's contours.
There are a number of other objections to the
traditional tort remedy as an effective alternative
to exclusion. 8 5 Certain variations of this remedy,
such as Chief Justice Burger's' 86 or Schlesinger's,
18 7
attempt to meet the traditional criticisms of the
tort remedy. Sovereign immunity, for example, can
be waived.'82 Where "civil death" statutes preclude
those imprisoned from suing for damages, such
statutes might be modified. Among other reasons
for objecting to a tort remedy or modification
thereof is that a claimant who has been charged
with crime is not likely to elicit a jury's sympathy.
Such a scheme may also encourage police officers
to lie about adherence to constitutional require-
ments during the search and seizure to avoid lia-
bility, and criminals' reputations, moreover, are
not such that they are likely to be injured by police
searches. 18 Furthermore, as the Second Circuit has
'8 Amsterdam, supra note 130, at 429-30.
183 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 32, (quoting Amster-
dam, supra note 130, at 430); see also Paulsen, supra note
30, at 260.
184 S. SCHLFSINGER, supra note 112, at 77.
1&5 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42-46 (1949) (Mur-
phy & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
Y., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at
422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
18 S. SCHLFSINGER, supra note 112, at 77.
'88 Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusion-
ary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 692-
94.
189 Id. See also, Comment, The Tort Alternative to the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 256, 263 (1972).
held on remand in Bivens, a police officer need not
prove probable cause to establish a defense in a
civil proceeding; a showing of a good faith belief
in the validity of the search and arrest is suffi-
cient. 190
It is difficult to see a cause of action such as the
one created in Bivens substituting for the role exclu-
sion plays in developing the fourth amendment
when the standard for defense to the tort claim
differs from the standard defining a fourth amend-
ment violation. If a fourth amendment tort action
or some modification thereof is pursued infre-
quently, it will not be effective either as a deterrent
or as a means of defining the reach of the fourth
amendment. According to LaFave, creation of a
special tribunal to adjudicate modified tort actions,
such as proposed by Chief Justice Burger, would
have the undesirable effect of withdrawing from
the higher courts
the important function of spelling out police author-
ity under the Fourth Amendment ... That
process of giving content to the Amendment which
occupies 'a place second to none in the Bill of Rights'
is too important to be shunted off upon a special
tribunal in the nature of a court of claims.
191
LaFave appears to overstate the dangers inhering
in Burger's proposal for creation of a special tri-
bunal in light of Burger's suggestion that appellate
review be made available under his scheme "on
much the same basis that it is now provided as to
district courts and regulatory agencies., 192 None-
theless, insofar as litigants decide not to appeal
decisions of a special tribunal, LaFave's criticism is
valid.
The literature proposes other means besides the
tort action to supplant or supplement exclusion.
193
Such alternatives include proposals for criminal
prosecution, injunctive relief, summary court pro-
ceedings to provide criminal punishment, and the
creation of an ombudsman. There are various other
alternatives dealing with internal and external po-
lice discipline, incentive systems, police training,
and restructured police-prosecutor relationships.
Certain of these proposals such as that of criminal
prosecution would seem, on their face, to present
little impediment to developing fourth amendment
standards, at least so long as they are regularly
employed. Other proposals such as internal police
i90 Geller, supra note 188, at 694.
,91 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 32-34.
192 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at
423 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
93 For a summary of these alternatives, see Geller, supra
note 188, at 689-722.
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discipline are not so promising in this regard, even
if regularly employed. In general, however, discus-
sion of these proposals does not take seriously
enough the necessity to fulfill the role of developing
fourth amendment standards if exclusion is dis-
carded.'9
In spite of the development of several alterna-
tives to exclusion in the scholarly literature, the
caselaw has neither discussed these alternatives at
length nor critically pursued the question of exclu-
sion or its alternatives as a means of defining the
reach of the fourth amendment. One well known
reference to these alternatives is that of Justice
Frankfurter in Wolfv. Colorado. One primary reason
for the Court's rejecting application of the exclu-
sionary rule to the states is the availability of other
remedies protecting the right of privacy. Alterna-
tives he suggests as serving this function are "the
remedies of private action and such protection as
the internal discipline of the police, under the eyes
of an alert public opinion, may afford."' 95 Mur-
phy's dissenting opinion, joined by Rutledge, is
critical of these alternatives, preferring exclusion to
Frankfurter's alternatives: "Imagination and zeal
may invent a dozen methods to give content to the
commands of the Fourth Amendment. But this
Court is limited to the remedies currently avail-
able."' 96 Wolf's facts presented an excellent context
for relating exclusion and its alternatives to the
problem of formulating fourth amendment stand-
ards. Neither the opinion of the Court nor Mur-
phy's dissent, however, pursued this line of in-
quiry.1
9 7
Mapp v. Ohio also provided a context potentially
conducive to careful examination of alternatives to
exclusion and their suitability for defining fourth
amendment rights. In the course of excluding evi-
dence obtained through the state violation, how-
ever, the Court simply dismissed other remedies as
"worthless and futile" in securing compliance with
constitutional provisions. The Court asserted but
failed to analyze the relative ineffectiveness of the
alternative remedies as deterrents. Nor did the
Court discuss the likely contribution of these alter-
natives to defining the content of the amend-
ment.
198
It is remarkable that the literature advocating
alternatives to exclusion has paid so little attention
to the consideration of providing a means for ju-
'94Id. at 713-22.
'95 338 U.S. at 31.
196 Id. at 41. (Murphy & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
197 Id. at 25, 41.
198 367 U.S. at 651-52.
dicial articulation of fourth amendment stand-
ards.5 9 Perhaps one important reason for this omis-
sion is that the conservative arguments tend to
respond to the primary rationales of the liberal
arguments, arguments which in general have been
received more sympathetically by the United
States Supreme Court than have their conservative
counterparts. Alternatives to exclusion tend to em-
phasize the goals of deterrence, protecting the in-
nocent against fourth amendment violations and
removing obstacles to punishing those guilty of
crime."°° The fact that the literature concerning
alternatives is cast in this manner is, at least to
some extent, a consequence of the shift to deter-
rence as the primary consideration in the exclusion
controversy. The importance of the judicial role in
protecting fourth amendment rights is minimized
in the conservative arguments. 20 1 Perhaps even
more importantly, when exclusion is not considered
either as a constitutional right or as a logical
outcome of the judicial review function, the per-
ceived importance of exclusion as a means to spell
out the contours of the fourth amendment is further
minimized.
Various reformers have suggested a number of
alternatives to replace or supplement the exclusion-
ary rule. All such proposals, however, share the
defect which Dellinger attributes to the Chief Jus-
tice's proposal:
[B]y disallowing in all cases the use of the exclusion-
ary rule to suppress evidence gathered in violation
of the fourth amendment, the Chief Justice's pro-
posal would permit the government to buy itself out
of having to comply with constitutional commands.
To abolish the exclusionary rule and replace it with
an action for damages against the governmental
treasury is to have the law speak with two voices.2ss
Dellinger's observation is an insightful one, but it
falls somewhat short of its mark. His observation is
'99Justice Brennan expresses concern for the potential
of the Court's decision in Peltier to "stop dead in its tracks
judicial development of Fourth Amendment rights." This
objection did not come in the context of alternative
remedies for fourth amendment violations, but rather in
his objection to the Court's decision to deny retroactive
application to the Court's decision in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Nonetheless, his opin-
ion indicates the concern of two Justices for preserving
the avenue forjudicial articulation of fourth amendment
standards. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554
(1975) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
mo See, e.g., S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 112, at 71.
2,' See text accompanying note 105 supra.
2m Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as
a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1562-63 (1972).
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valid only if exclusion is a constitutional require-
ment in which case the replacement of exclusion
by any alternative remedy is objectionable because
it violates constitutional principle and denies a
constitutional right.
The discussion of alternatives is rich with inter-
esting and important considerations. These various
policy considerations such as judicial integrity and
deterrence contain inconclusive claims by partisans
of both liberal and conservative persuasions. The
competing claims regarding deterrence are the
dominant considerations in the literature and case-
law. Because of their importance to the debate,
these claims have been subjected to a number of
empirical studies, studies which are the object of
the next section of this analysis.
IV. EMPIRICAL STUDIES, DETERRENCE, AND
EXCLUSION
The arguments supporting and opposing exclu-
sion have been examined. It was discovered that
these arguments are specific outgrowths of the
liberal credo and the due process model on the one
hand and the conservative credo and the crime
control model on the other. Many of the arguments
supporting and opposing exclusion are of a specu-
lative nature and can be refuted by those who
approach the problem from the other ideological
persepective. Central to each of the opposing po-
sitions is whether or not exclusion deters unlawful
police behavior. The question of deterrence has
also emerged as the primary rationale underlying
Supreme Court pronouncements.
Commentators have tried to resolve the exclusion
controversy on empirical grounds. The empirical
studies have concentrated on the consideration of
deterrence, not only because of its central place in
the exclusion controversy, but one suspects because
whatever difficulties are intrinsic to measuring de-
terrence, they pale in comparison to problems in-
volved in examining empirically certain other con-
servative and liberal rationales. Even the most
talented empirical social scientist would undertake
the measurement and causal analysis of judicial
integrity or trust in government with trepidation.
This section will not attempt a systematic cri-
tique of the empirical studies, for such a critique
can be found in a number of other sources and is
not necessary to advancing the argument of this
article.203 Rather, the focus will be on demonstrat-
203 See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL
POLICY 220-54 (1977); S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 112;
Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New
ing the inconclusiveness of the major empirical
studies in answering whether the exclusionary rule
is an effective deterrent and the larger question of
whether the rule ought to be abandoned.
Two early attempts at empirical examination of
the effects of exclusion are that of Professor John
Barker Waite and Justice Murphy. Professor
Waite's study, originally published in 1933, con-
cludes that at least one fourth of those in his sample
of "gun-toters discovered and arrested during that
year escaped any penalty, not because they were
innocent, but solely because of the judge-made rule




Waite also observes that "not one shred of evi-
dence" indicates that police in two states which
permitted use of evidence gained through illegal
searches and seizures were worse behaved than the
police in two states which employed the exclusion-
ary rule.205 One need hardly enumerate the diffi-
culties of relying on such a study for contemporary
use, but it does illustrate an early concern for the
policy questions which currently dominate the de-
bate over exclusion.
Justice Murphy's dissent in Wolfv. Colorado con-
tains a summary of eleven replies he received in
response to a questionnaire he sent to thirty-eight
randomly selected large cities.ms Of six cities op-
erating with the exclusionary rule, five reported
extensive police training, whereas only one of five
cities operating without the exclusionary rule re-
ported extensive training. From these responses,
Murphy inferred a "positive demonstration" of the
rule's efficacy.0 7 Apart from the small sample,
Murphy's statement does not demonstrate that the
police training had significant deterrent effects on
police behavior.0
Data and a Plea against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J.
681 (1974); Geller, supra note 188; Kaplan, supra note
108; Oaks, supra note 3; Wright, supra note 107; Com-
ment, Critique, On the Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of
the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto Research and
United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 740 (1974).
20i Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH.
L. REv. 679, 688 (1944).
205Id. at 685.
2oo 338 U.S. at 44-46, quoted in Oaks, supra note 3, at
678-79.
'O'Id.
0 Oaks, supra note 3, at 679. A later, post-Mapp study
of opinion of various participants in the criminal process
indicates greater educational efforts in those states that
were compelled by Mapp to adopt the exclusionary rule.
This study also indicates a comparative decrease in police
effectiveness in searches following Mapp. Nagel, Testing
the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L.
REv. 283, 283-86. A study of the opinions of police chiefs,
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An important study of exclusion prior to Mapp
v. Ohio is a student inquiry of motions to suppress
during 1950 in the Chicago Municipal Court. This
study focuses on gambling, narcotics and certain
weapons violations. 2 1 In the gambling cases, sev-
enty-seven percent of the defendants moved to
suppress; ninety-nine percent of these motions were
granted. There were no convictions after suppres-
sion. The students conclude that the exclusionary
rule was not a significant deterrent. They also infer
that their study
may indicate that the exclusionary rule is most
effective in discouraging illegal searches in cases
involving serious offenses, where conviction is im-
portant. Conversely, where the police believe that a
policy of harassment is an effective means of law
enforcement, the exclusionary rule will not deter
their use of unlawful methods.
21
While these figures do not prove the absence of any
deterrent effect in gambling cases, they do indicate
a remarkable failure of police to observe search and
seizure rules. Although lower, the figures in nar-
cotics and weapons cases lead to the same conclu-
sions.2 ' It is necessary to remember, of course, that
these results were obtained for specific types of
violations in one city.
In 1970, Dallin Oaks conducted an ambitious
study of exclusion, a study which the Supreme
Court and analysts of the exclusion controversy
have cited frequently. He utilized data from other
studies, including the Chicago student study con-
ducted in 1950. He also adds data of his own which
were gathered in 1969 from extensive work in
Cincinnati and from less extensive study of police
records in Chicago and Washington, D.C. 212 Oaks
sheriffs, prosecutors, and defense counsel in North Caro-
lina shows that about 75 percent of them regarded exclu-
sion as an effective deterrent. Katz, Supreme Court and the
State: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina, 45 N.C.
L. REV. 119 (1966). It should be emphasized that these
studies are reflections of the opinions of those involved in
the criminal process. Both studies are included in Oaks'
discussion of measurement of the effects of exclusion.
Oaks, supra note 3, at 678-81.
20 It should be emphasized that Illinois adopted the
exclusionary rule in 1924, some 37 years prior to Mapp,
in People v. Castree, 311 111. 392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
See Canon, supra note 7, at 402.
211 Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of
the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 493,
497-98 (1952).
211 Oaks, supra note 3, at 684-85. For a discussion of
why exclusion is not likely to deter in gambling and
prostitution cases, see W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION
TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 411-27 (1965).
212 Oaks, supra note 3, at 678-709.
employs three research methods to obtain his data.
He compares law enforcement conduct and the
operation of the criminal justice system before and
after adoption of the exclusionary rule in his "be-
fore-after" method. He compares these factors in a
jurisdiction that has the exclusionary rule with a
jurisdiction that does not in his "multiple area"
method. His third method, "field observation,"
attempts to determine the rule's effect during a
single period of time by such means as drawing
inferences from the percentage of motions to sup-
press granted in particular types of crime.2 13 Oaks
sets out his findings in summary fashion. This
summary includes the Chicago student study dis-
cussed above as well as an analysis of the eviden-
tiary grounds for arrest and disposition of narcotics
cases in New York City before and after Mapp.
2i 4
Oaks' first conclusion is that "[m]ore than half
the motions to suppress ... concerned narcotics
and weapons offenses." Most of the other motions
involved gambling in Chicago and offenses against
property in the District of Columbia. He finds this
a persuasive indication that the search and seizure
practices affected by exclusion are concentrated in
the enforcement of these crimes.215 The 1969 figures
for Chicago indicate no deterrence of illegal
searches in the enforcement of a large number of
gambling, narcotics, and weapons offenses. Oaks
recognizes that great care must be exercised in
comparing law enforcement statistics from differ-
ent jurisdictions since, for example, District of Co-
lumbia figures reflect a screening function and
failure to file some cases when evidence is likely to
be suppressed.216
Oaks' study of Cincinnati law enforcement sta-
tistics shows that adoption of the exclusionary rule
apparently did not affect the number of convictions
or arrests in gambling, narcotics, or weapons of-
fenses. The decision in Mapp had no immediate
effect on the amount of stolen property recovered,
but there was a gradual decrease beginning several
years after the decision. The quantity of property
seized in Cincinnati during eighteen-month pe-
riods immediately before and after Mapp shows
dramatic decreases in seizure of gambling appara-
213 Id. at 678.
214 Note, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure
Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 87
(1968).
215 Oaks, supra note 3, at 706.
216 In 1969, approximately 45 percent of all persons
charged with gambling offenses in Chicago were being
dismissed after successful motions to suppress. This figure
was 33 percent for narcotics offenses and 24 percent for
carrying a concealed weapon. Id.
[Vol. 71
LIBERALS, CONSERVATIVES, AND THE EXCLUSIOMARY RULE
tus, but, no change in seizure of narcotics or
weapons. Although the Mapp decision may have
contributed to the decrease in seizure of gambling
apparatus, the decrease may also be wholly or
partially attributable to changes in law enforce-
ment techniques begun two years prior to Mapp.21
Oaks' study suggests that police training in
search and seizure is more extensive where there is
an exclusionary rule. In addition, the proportionate
incidence of legal searches and seizures seems gen-
erally to have increased after Mapp. States having
an exclusionary rule prior to Mapp exhibited
smaller increases than did states forced by Mapp to
adopt the rule. Not surprisingly, effectiveness ap-
parently was perceived to have decreased, and less
so in states having their own exclusionary rule prior
to Mapp.218 The conclusiveness of these findings is
questionable. Oaks' research consists primarily of
inferences drawn from Cincinnati arrest records of
those crimes most often associated with search and
seizure. Also, his results may well be dated some
ten to fifteen years after the fact.2t
Michael Ban conducted two studies of the rule's
impact in the mid-1960s. His assessment of the
number of search warrants and motions to suppress
includes periods prior and subsequent to Mapp.
Based on an increase in search warrants from one
hundred to one thousand in Boston and from zero
to one hundred in Cincinnati between 1960 and
1963, opposing inferences can be drawn. Whether
one infers from these figures "that the rule is not
an effective deterrent"' ' 0 or that "the Boston fig-
ures imply considerable if begrudging police com-
pliance,"'2 this much is clear: these figures do not
dispose of the question whether or not the exclu-
sionary rule is an effective deterrent.
In the early 1970s Professor Bradley Canon rep-
licated Oaks' Cincinnati study for nineteen other
American cities.2 2 He reported that ten of these
cities exhibited minimal or no variance in statistics
on arrests for most search and seizure crimes follow-
ing Mapp; nine cities showed a statistically signifi-
cant decrease in arrests for these crimes.2 One
difficulty with Canon's conclusion is that a stable
level of arrests for a given crime does not necessarily
indicate whether exclusion is changing search and
217 Id. at 707.
218 Id. at 708.
219 Canon, supra note 7, at 400.
2 S. ScHLESINGER, supra note 112, at 54.
221 Canon, supra note 7, at 401.
22 Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies
at the State and Federal Levels: The Case of the Exclusionay
,
Rule, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977).
223 Id. at 72, Table 2.
seizure practices. 224 Oaks' study suffers from the
same flaw.Ys No decrease in arrests following Mapp,
for example, may indicate either a disregard for
the decision or an adherence to it with no detri-
mental effect on number of arrests. In addition,
Canon's study does not indicate whether the per-
centage of illegal arrests has declined because he
groups legal and illegal arrests together; he also
fails to examine unlawful searches and seizures
which did not result in arrests. 6 Such statistics
may be helpful in determining whether Mapp in-
terferes with arrest rates only if the number of
crimes and other factors are held constant.
A second part of Canon's study was based on a
questionnaire sent to public defenders, prosecutors,
and police departments in American cities with a
population of over 100,000.27 The questionnaire
was designed to determine if the effectiveness of
the exclusionary rule has increased with the passage
of time. Examining respondents' comparison of
current search and seizure practices with those of
1967, Canon found that two-thirds of the depart-
ments reported more restrictive rules governing
searches; fifty percent of the cities reported that
motions to suppress were granted less than ten
percent of the time (only a modest change from
1967). m Canon concludes that the exclusionary
rule is currently more effective than in the imme-
diate post-Mapp years.m
Canon's findings have not gone unchallenged.
Schlesinger argues that the sample of respondents
was neither random nor representative, and that
the questionnaires may not have been answered
candidly because of attempts to put the police in
a favorable light. ° Schlesinger also objects to the
inferences drawn by Canon from the data. Because
of other possible causes for these changes, "they
hardly make a case for a substantial deterrent
effect.'
1
The last significant study is that ofJames Spiotto
published in 1973. 2 Spiotto compared the results
of a study of motions to suppress in search and
224 Canon, supra note 7, at 400.
225 Oaks, supra note 3, at 689-93.
22 D. HoROwrTz, supra note 203, at 232.
22 Canon, supra note 203.
2' Id. at 712, Table 6; 715, Table 8; 722, Table 10.
24 Canon, supra note 7, at 401.
2 Schlesinger, supra note 7, at 406-07. It is difficult to
understand what motive defense lawyers would have to
"give the police a favorable image." Schlesinger's reser-
vation is valid in the case of police-respondents.
23' Id. at 407.
23 Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the




seizure crimes in Chicago for 1950, 1969, and 1971.
He found that from 1950 to 1970, during which
time the exclusionary rule was introduced into
Illinois, there was a proportional increase in mo-
tions to suppress for narcotics and guns. He con-
cluded that if the exclusionary rule had a strong
deterrent effect on the police, the proportional
number of motions to suppress would have de-
creased.2 3 However, Illinois had adopted a state
exclusionary rule in 1924; thus, what his data prove
is not clear, but surely they do not support Spiotto's
conclusion.
Professor Kamisar summarizes the inconclusive-
ness of the empirical studies in the context of noting
disagreement in rationales among those who would
abolish the rule:
I cannot resist pointing out that at the same time
some critics of the exclusionary rule are urging its
elimination or substantial modification on the
ground, inter alia, that it has had little if any impact
on the amount of pre-Mapp illegality, other critics
are calling for the rule's repeal or revision on the
ground, inter alia, that in recent years the police have
attained such a high incidence of compliance with Fourth
Amendment requirements that "the absolute sanctions of
the Exclusionary Rule are no longer necessary to
'police' them."' "
The data giving rise to the latter argument come
from a national study of more than one thousand
cases of warrantless searches and seizures decided
by appellate courts from 1970-72. Eighty-four per-
cent of these searches and seizures were found
proper by the appellate courts.2 The argument
denies that the exclusionary rule is responsible for
this remarkable record of police compliance and
instead atttibutes it to "police professionalism."
This justification, without more, is unpersuasive.2 3 6
As Professor Kamisar's observation makes clear,
not only do proponents and opponents of exclusion
differ in their interpretations of exclusion, but crit-
ics of the rule cannot agree which conclusions of
the empirical studies best support their cases. Al-
most all the empirical studies have been subjected
2.3 Id. at 276.
3'4 Kamisar (1978), supra note 144, at 72-73 (quoting
Brief of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement
(A.E.L.E.) and the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (I.A.C.P.) as arnica curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 12, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972) [herein-
after cited as A.E.L.E. Brief]).
25Id. (quoting the A.E.L.E. Brief at 17).
236 A.E.L.E. Brief at 17-18 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 416 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
to severe criticism; none can claim to conclusively
answer the questions of exclusion's effects. Any
conclusion drawn from these studies must be ten-
tative and qualified.
Thus, the present empirical evidence on the
deterrent effect of exclusion is not adequate to
dispose of the controversy.2 7 This deficiency is
exacerbated by the age of Mapp: pre-Mapp data
have become dated. Methods dependent upon sub-
jective evidence such as questionnaires are partic-
ularly subject to this defect. In short, "it presently
appears to be impossible to design any single test
or group of tests that would give a reliable measure
of the overall deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule on law enforcement behavior."=
The question of exclusion has generally been
narrowed to that of whether the rule deters unlaw-
ful police conduct. But even this narrowing of the
inquiry has failed to provide a conclusive answer
when put to empirical tests. We must turn to yet
another field of inquiry to answer the question of
exclusion.
V. EXCLUSION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
A. EXCLUSION AS A REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS
OF LAW OR LAW OF THE LAND
The liberal and conservative arguments have
been examined. Each of the arguments from these
opposing camps is a particular manifestation both
of its parent ideology and a competing model of
the criminal process. Characteristically, the argu"
ments are policy analyses detached from consider-
ations of constitutionalism. In addition, empirical
analysts focusing on the policy of deterrence have
constructed studies to test the deterrent impact of
exclusion. The remainder of this article attempts
27 One commentator asserts that a "heavy burden" of
proof is necessary to justify the rule because of the high
price it exacts. S. SCHLESINGER, supra note 7, at 408. He is
certainly right that no such heavy burden of proof has
been met. But, as Dworkin recognizes, "the assignment
of the burden of proof on an issue where evidence does
not exist and cannot be obtained is outcome determina-
tive. The Chief Justice's assignment of the burden is
merely a way of announcing a predetermined conclu-
sion." Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 INn. L.J. 329, 332-33
(1973). This assertion regarding burden of proof is radi-
cally altered if exclusion is accepted as a constitutional
right. See section V infra.
'8 Oaks, supra note 3, at 716. Certain difficulties in-
volved in empirical measurement of issues related to law
and deterrence in another context are discussed in L.
SUNDERLAND, OBSCENITY: THE COURT, THE CONGRESS,
AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION 71-84 (1974).
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to transcend ideological and empirical considera-
tions and concentrate on considerations of consti-
tutional principle.=
Amsterdam favors exclusion as a necessary evil
because "the supposed alternatives to it are pie in
the sky":2
40
I am not suggesting that the exclusionary rule is
an explicit command of the Constitution, nor do I
mean to make more of the Fourth Amendment's
language than the skin of the living thought that
dwells within. The rule was fashioned by judges as
an expression of that thought. What the Constitution
does command is that the administration of the
system of criminal justice be so ordered as not to
produce incentives toward unreasonable search and
seizure which it is not fully capable of restraining.
Unless and until a far better system of restraints is
devised and put into effective operation than we
now have or can soon anticipate, the exclusionary
sanction is the only way to honor that command.24'
No one can disagree with Amsterdam's contention
that exclusion is not an explicit command of the
Constitution if he means by this that exclusion is
not spelled out in the Constitution. However, ac-
cording to Amsterdam, the Constitution does com-
mand that the criminal justice system be ordered
so as not to produce incentives toward unconsti-
tutional searches and seizures the system is not
capable of restraining. He does not indicate which
constitutional provision contains this latter com-
mand.
Professor Kamisar, in a recent article, empha-
sizes the judicial integrity argument in his defense
of exclusion:
The courts, after all, are the specific addressees of
the constitutional command that "no warrants shall
issue, but upon" certain prescribed conditions ....
The government whose agents violated the Consti-
tution should be in no better position than the
government whose agents obeyed it; "the efforts of
the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment ... are not to be aided by the sacrifice
of [Fourth Amendment] principles." Is any of this
really so hard to follow?
242
Kamisar's logic appeals to some; it does not appeal
to all. 3 His position lacks both the conviction and
29 This section will draw on arguments which ap-
peared in Sunderland, supra note 143, and in Schrock &
Welsh, supra note 44.240 Amsterdam, supra note 130.
241 Id. at 433.
242 Kamisar (1978), supra note 144, at 68.
243 See, e.g., Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress
Valid Evidence? 62 JuozcA'uRE 214 (1978).
support that the exclusionary rule is as much a
part of the Constitution as is the warrant require-
ment. In this sense, both Kamisar and Amsterdam
reflect positions similar to that of the literature and
caselaw discussed above which support the rule of
exclusion but seem to regard it as a kind of quasi-
constitutional law that cannot be supported by
reference to fundamental constitutional implica-
tions.244
A reluctance exists among commentators and
jurists to treat exclusion as a right or requirement
of constitutional principle. Professor LaFave ex-
cludes such consideration from the rationales for
exclusion in his three-volume treatise.24 5 Professor
Wingo raises some interesting objections to the
argument that exclusion is constitutionally based:
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures and requires that warrants be
issued only upon a showing of probable cause, but
there is no statement concerning enforcement of
these guarantees. It is certainly reasonable to assume
that had the Fourth Amendment been designed to
require exclusion of evidence seized in violation of
its provisions, it would have been drafted so as to
make this purpose explicit.
246
In certain respects, Wingo goes to the heart of
the matter. If the rule is not a constitutional re-
quirement, then the entire context of the argument
shifts and matters such as federalism, the proper
supervisory authority of the Court, the relative
authority of Congress, and the relevancy of various
policy factors become the fundamental considera-
tions: in short, without a constitutional justifica-
tion, the Court has no business imposing the rule
on the states. On the other hand, one must question
the criterion of constitutionality advocated by
Wingo-the explicit language in the Constitution.
By this standard, Wingo would have great diffi-
culty justifying either the doctrine of judicial re-
view or the application of important Bill of Rights
freedoms to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
There are, however, commentators and jurists
who take seriously exclusion as an intrinsic consti-
tutional requirement or constitutional right. Paul-
sen has described exclusion as a "rule naturally
suggested by the Constitution itself."2 4 7 Coe pre-
sents three rationales for exclusion, the first of
244 Kaplan, supra note -108, at 1030.
24 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 17-20.
246 Wingo, supra note 109, at 585.
247 Paulsen, supra note 30, at 257.
LANE V. SUNDERLAND
which is exclusion as a remedial or personal
right:2 48 "The notion underlying this view of the
exclusionary rule is that the Fourth Amendment
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure is a
personal right, and that exclusion of evidence is
somehow inherent in that right."249 But Coe's
"somehow" remains equivocal. The caselaw also
refers to exclusion as a constitutional right, al-
though as we have seen, the Court's majority does
not hold this view.2 ° Where the caselaw does gloss
exclusion with constitutionalism, it generally suf-
fers the same shortcomings as the analysis of the
commentators discussed above: both merely assert
that exclusion is a constitutional requirement with-
out adequately supporting the assertion through
constitutional argument.
Such an argument, however, can be developed
from suggestions in Supreme Court decisions. Boyd
v. United States held unconstitutional the compul-
sory production of business papers under the pro-
visions of an Act of 18 7 4 .25' The Act authorized a
court of the United States to require the defendant
or claimant in revenue cases to produce his private
books, invoices and papers in court, or the allega-
tions against the individual would be taken as
confessed. The Court obscured the rationale for its
holding the applicable parts of the statute repug-
nant to the fourth and fifth amendments without
giving an adequate rationale for this coupling:
[A] compulsory production of the private books and
papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited
in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness
against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution; and is the equiva-
lent of a search and seizure, and an unreasonable
search and seizure, within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
2 2
Justice Bradley began his analysis with the prop-
osition that a violation of the fourth amendment's
ban on unreasonable searches and seizures does not
require actual entry upon the premises. A compul-
sory production of books and papers such as that
authorized by this Act "is within the spirit and
meaning of the Amendment."M The Act's making
the nonproduction of such papers a confession of
248 Coe, supra note 156, at 14-15. The other rationales
he discusses are those ofjudicial integrity and deterrence.
Id. at 15-24.
249 Id. at 14. See also Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclu-
sionary Rule: Past, Present, No Future, 12 AM. CRiM. L. REV.
507 (1975).
250 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.
251 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
252 Id. at 634-35.
25 Id. at 620-22.
allegations is equivalent to compulsory production.
Furthermore, the compulsory production of the
private papers runs counter to the prohibition
against self-incrimination of the fifth amendment.
Finally, Bradley joins the fourth and fifth amend-
ments in characterizing them as both relating to
the personal security of the citizen.254
Various criticisms may be leveled at the Court's
opinion in Boyd although it has been praised as
being "a case which will be remembered as long as
civil liberty lives in the United States"" 5 and "the
leading case on the subject of search and
seizure." 2 " Justice Miller articulated certain of
these criticisms in a separate opinion.2 57 Although
Miller showed concern that the Act compelled the
party to be a witness against himself in violation of
the fifth amendment, he did not regard the Act as
violating the fourth amendment.m A number of
commentators likewise criticize Bradley's reliance
on the fourth-fifth amendment nexus given the
"clear" violation of the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. 259 The result of Boyd is
the creation of a fourth amendment exclusionary
rule in what is generally agreed to be a fifth
amendment case. This interpretation of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule through the fifth
amendment has the unfortunate consequence of
obscuring the necessity for addressing the issue of
exclusion for fourth amendment violations on its
own merits. This legacy of Boyd was to be reflected
in later decisions. A principal example is Justice
Black's reliance on a self-incrimination theory in
Mapp v. Ohio, a reliance which split the majority in
Mapp on the important issue of the rationale un-
derlying the exclusionary rule.2 "0 Black's reliance
on a self-incrimination rationale for exclusion of
evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment is illustrative of the criticism Schrock and
Welsh make of Boyd:
In Boyd, Bradley seemed to be bringing the fourth to
the aid of the already sufficient fifth, but the effect
of what he did was to make later judges think the
2 Id. at 627-30.2" Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 474 (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting).
2-6 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 6 (quoting One 1958
Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925)).
257 116 U.S. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring).
m
0 Id.
259 Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-
Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv. 1, 191 (1930);
Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and
Seizure, 8 A.B.A.J. 479 (1922).
260 367 U.S. at 662-66 (Black, J., concurring).
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fifth had to be brought to the aid of the fourth. And
one upshot of that prejudice is that present day
opponents of the exclusionary rule think they have
dispatched the constitutional personal rights basis
for the exclusionary rule when they have discredited
the Boyd fourth-fifth combination. Bradley both es-
tablished and undermined the exclusionary rule in
the same opinion.
265
The linking of the fourth amendment with the
fifth amendment's self-incrimination provisions is
also objectionable from the perspective of history.
Wigmore and Chafee, for example, agree that the
two provisions grew out of different contexts and
different historical periods in England.es Thus,
Boyd v. United States provides a shallow foundation
for fourth amendment exclusion.
Several years after Boyd, exclusion based on
fourth amendment violations was rejected in Adams
v. New York. 263 Although the Court might have
disposed of the issue on other grounds, Justice
Day's opinion of the Court adhered to the com-
mon-law rule of admissibility, under which "the
courts do not stop to inquire as to the means by
which the evidence was obtained." 2  Only ten
years later, in the case of Weeks v. United States, the
Court in turn, rejected the doctrine of the Adams
case. In Weeks, a unanimous Court articulated an
exclusionary rule based on fourth amendment con-
siderations and clearly rejected the common law
view that evidence was admissible regardless of
how it was obtained. The evidence on the basis of
which Weeks was convicted and which the Su-
261 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 44, at 283 n.97. Chief
Justice Burger raises another objection to the fourth-fifth
amendment logic:
Even ignoring, however, the decisions of this
Court that have held that the Fifth Amendment
applies only to "testimonial" disclosures,.., it seems
clear that the Self-Incrimination Clause does not
protect a person from the seizure of evidence that is
incriminating. It protects a person only from being
the conduit by which the police acquire evidence.
Mr. Justice Holmes once put it succinctly, "A party
is privileged from producing the evidence, but not
from its production."
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 414-
15.
262j. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 2184, at 31
(1904); Chafee, The Progress of The Law, 1919-1922, 35
HARV. L. REV. 673, 697-98 (1922), cited in J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 58 n.40 (1966). See
also Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Princi-
ple: Miranda v. Arizona and Bqond, 15 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 171, 171-88 (1979).
263 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
264 Id. at 594.
preme Court ordered excluded was seized from his
home in two warrantless searches. This evidence
included private papers like those involved in Boyd.
Weeks contains elements which seem to be pre-
cursors of the current judicial integrity argument,
one example of which follows:
[T]he duty of giving to it [the Fourth Amendment]
force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted
under our Federal system with the enforcement of
the laws. The tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain convictions
by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confes-
sions ... finds no sanction in the judgments of the26,5
courts. ...
The essence of this argument is that all govern-
mental bodies exercising power under the Consti-
tution, including the judiciary, must function in
accordance with that law. In the case of searches
and seizures, this enforcement must follow the
commands of the fourth amendment. The second
aspect of this argument in Weeks is that the courts
should not sanction any departures from the Con-
stitution because the courts are responsible for
supporting the Constitution and for maintaining
fundamental constitutional rights. This argument
is similar to that made in later cases which justify
the exclusionary rule on the basis of its being
necessary to maintain judicial integrity. 26 Clearly,
however, Weeks did not regard exclusion as simply
a discretionary act of judicial integrity. Rather,
exclusion itself is a constitutional requirement, the
denial of which Weeks characterized as "a denial of
the constitutional rights of the accused."20 7
Although Weeks indicates that exclusion is rooted
in the Constitution, it does not clearly demonstrate
how it arrived at this conclusion. Thus, it is neces-
sary to construct such an argument, an argument




265 232 U.S. at 392 (1914).
266 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. at 222, cited in
Ma v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 659.
'-232 U.S. at 398.
26 The argument presented herein requiring exclusion
as a consequence of the Constitution's due process pro-
visions is drawn from an earlier article in which it was
presented in a different context. Sunderland, supra note
143. Geller and Kamisar present arguments in their work
which hint at such an interpretation. Kamisar raises this
rationale in the context of discussing the application of
the fourth amendment to the states through the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause. Geller raises this
rhetorical question: "What does the due process clause
mean if it does not mean that a defendant cannot be
convicted on evidence obtained in violation of due process
1980]
LANE V SUNDERLAND
The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring
the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are,
are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great
principles established by years of endeavor and suf-
fering which have resulted in their embodiment in
the fundamental law of the land 26
9
In other words, both courts and other governmen-
tal officials must preserve the principles embodied
in the fundamental law of the land, including the
law of the Constitution. Former ChiefJustice Tray-
nor of the California Supreme Court argued in
favor of the exclusionary rule in a similar manner:
"[The argument against the exclusionary rule] was
rejected when those [fourth amendment] provisions
were adopted. In such cases had the Constitution
been obeyed, the criminal could in no event be
convicted. ,270
Like much of the legal argument supporting
exclusion, both Traynor's insistence that the Con-
stitution be obeyed and Weeks' requirement that
courts be bound by the fundamental law of the
land have an intuitively satisfying ring. Yet, these
opinions do not present a principled and coherent
argument justifying their assertion that the Consti-
tution requires the exclusionary rule.27' Why would
an alternative remedy which obeys the commands
of the fourth amendment not be equally accepta-
ble? The judicial opinions do not adequately an-
swer this question-a question raised most clearly
by Chief Justice Burger in Bivens
2 7 2
One reason why an alternative remedy should
not replace the exclusionary rule is that the due
process clause of the fifth amendment requires the
exclusionary rule in instances of federal violations
of the fourth amendment. The relevant part of the
fifth amendment reads "nor [shall any person] be
of law?" Kamisar's observation does not apply to the
federal government since the fourteenth amendment ap-
plies only to the states. Geller merely hints at a due
process argument through raising this rhetorical question
and does not pursue it or its implications. Kamisar, supra
note 144, at 79; Geller, supra note 188, at 641. Schrock
and Welsh make an argument which is developed differ-
ently but is similar to mine. Schrock & Welsh, supra note
44, at 326, 335, 364.
269 232 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added).
270 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,444, 282 P.2d 905,
914 (1955).271 This characterization seems appropriate, for much
of the reasoning contained in opinions discussed in pre-
vious sections was shown inadequate in terms of support-
ing the exclusionary rule.
272 Chief Justice Burger argues in Bivens that if an
alternative remedy is available, it would fulfill the de-
mands of maintaining judicial integrity. 403 U.S. at 414
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law." 273 Due process of law is derivd
from the phrase "law of the land" in section 29 of
the Magna Carta: "No free man shall be taken or
imprisoned or disseized or exiled or in any way
destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor send upon
him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or
by the law of the land. 2 74 The phrase, "due process
of law" first appeared in 1354 in a statutory recon-
firmation of this section of the Magna Carta, some-
times called the "Statute of Westminister of the
Liberties of London," which, as Coke argued,
equated this term to "by the law of the land."27'
This equation has early, authorative, and contin-
uous support from the Supreme Court of the
United States as well.2 7 6 An often cited example of
this basis in American law is the case of Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., where the
Court noted, "The words, 'due process of law,'
were undoubtedly intended to convey the same
meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land.' ),277
Justice Curtis went on to ask how a court is to
determine whether "process, enacted by Congress,
is due process?" Sustaining this identity between
law of the land and due process, Justice Curtis
properly identified the Constitution as the first
source of the content of due process: "We must
examine the constitution itself, to see whether this
process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If
not found to be so, we must look to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the
common and statute law of England....,278
The due process requirement thus might be
paraphrased to say that any deprivation of life,
liberty, or property must be in accordance with the
law of the land, or, at the very least, according to
the commands of the authoritative legal declara-
tion of the American law of the land, the Consti-
tution. According to this argument, the due process
clause of the fifth amendment would allow no
deprivation of life, liberty, or property except in-
sofar as the commands of the Constitution are
followed throughout the proceedings. Therefore,
273 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
274 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1138 n.3 (L. Jayson ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED].
275Id. at 1138 (citing 2 E. COKE, INsTiTUTES 50-51
(1641); see R. Mo-r, DUE PRocESs OF LAW 4-5 (1923)).
276 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908);
Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 101 (1877).
277 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855).
278 Id. at 277. For a restrictive interpretation of the
"law of the land" concept, see Berger, "Law of the Land"
Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1979).
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any deprivation of life, liberty, or property violat-
ing the fourth amendment search and seizure pro-
visions violates the explicit requirements of the due
process clause. As a matter of constitutional prin-
ciple, in any proceeding which may result in the
deprivation of life, liberty or property, evidence or
testimony gained through violation of the fourth
amendment (or any other constitutional provision)
may not be used because the due process clause of
the fifth amendment prohibits such use.
At the state level, the argument for exclusion here
presented applies as follows: the search and seizure
provisions applicable to* the states through the
fourteenth amendment are a part of that law of
the land which binds the actions of the states; no
state may deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property unless that deprivation be in accordance
with this law of the land; evidence gained in
violation of these forms must be suppressed.279 If
one accepts, arguendo, the "absorption" of the fourth
amendment by the fourteenth, then there is no
difference between what the fourth amendment
and the fourteenth amendment require relating to
search and seizure. Under this "absorption" inter-
pretation, the theory of exclusion would operate at
both the state and federal levels.
280
279 The interpretation of due process contained herein
does not necessarily imply a total incorporationist theory
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Since the fifth amendment due process clause relates to
the national government and the fourteenth amendment
due process clause relates to the states, the particular
rights each guarantees to the individual need not be
identical. That is, the rights which are a part of the law
of the land that governs the relationship of the individual
to the national government need not be identical to the
rights that are a part of the law of the land which governs
the relationship of the individual to state governments. It
is not within the scope of this article to treat at length
either the substantive constitutional law of search and
seizure required by the fourth amendment or the prob-
lematic theory of incorporation. The mandate of the
theory contained herein is simply this: whatever the
content of these rights which are a part of the law of the
land, substantial violations of these rights cannot be a
part of the process by which an individual is deprived of
life, liberty or property.
2SThe standard of reasonableness is currently the
same as it relates to search and seizure under both the
fourth and fourteenth amendments, but the Court has
emphasized that the demands of the federal system com-
pel a distinction between evidence held inadmissible
because of the Court's supervisory powers over federal
courts and that held inadmissible because prohibited by
the United States Constitution. Differences could con-
ceivably arise in which conduct would constitute a sub-
stantial violation of the rules of evidence to be applied in
federal criminal prosecutions but would not constitute a
Novelty of interpretation is not a cardinal virtue
in constitutional law. However, as applied to a due
process rationale for the exclusionary rule, that
novelty is counterbalanced by three factors: (I) this
interpretation has roots in the early case of Weeks
v. United States;ssl (2) the argument supporting the
Court's enforcement of the exclusionary rule, as
well as much of the scholarly commentary, is based
to a large degree on a kind of intuition that the
Constitution requires the rule; (3) although not
directly supportable through explicit historical in-
tention or precedent, the logic of principled con-
struction and certain cases strongly support this
interpretation of the exclusionary rule.
B. EXCLUSION AS A REQUIREMENT OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
A second constitutionally based argument sup-
porting the exclusionary rule justifies exclusion as
a consequence of judicial review.s2 Paulsen states
that whereas most constitutional or statutory re-
strictions on police conduct are abstract decisions,
the exclusionary rule applies the decision to the
particular case. He then states that "the use of the
rule is a natural consequence of the restrictive prin-
ciple. The rule is needed to make the constitutional
or statutory safeguards something real."2 Paulsen
intimates a relationship between judicial review
and exclusion without articulating or justifying it.
Similarly, Coe leads the analysis in the proper
direction-toward a nondiscretionary role for the
courts that fulfills their constitutional function. He
writes that the judicial integrity rationale, rooted
in institutional considerations, "seeks to allow the
judiciary to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities
by declining to 'legitimize unconstitutional con-
duct.' "28 However, he does not attempt to justify
this assertion.
substantial violation of fourteenth amendment standards.
Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
I am grateful to Professor Richard G. Stevens for his
helpful suggestions regarding this section and the article
as a whole.
28 232 U.S. at 393.
282 A number of sources suggest or explicitly mention
ajudicial review rationale for exclusion, certain of which
are cited or discussed herein. The most comprehensive
and profound discussion of exclusion as it relates to
judicial review from which this section of the present
article draws is Schrock & Welsh, supra note 44.
s Paulsen, supra note 30, at 259 (emphasis added).
24 Coe, supra note 156, at 16-17 (quoting Note, supra
note 249, at 5 10-1 1). The analysis from which Coe draws
his reference to legitimizing unconstitutional conduct
1980]
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In order to make the argument that exclusion is
a required consequence of judicial review, it is
necessary to recall the familiar principle of Marbury
v. Madison: "[i]t is, emphatically, the province and
duty of the judicial department, to say what the
law is." This law binds all three branches of
government, branches which derive their very pow-
ers and authority from the Constitution. The Court
enters the governmental process at a particular
time in the context of the controversy between the
parties before it. In the case of a legislative enact-
ment, the constitutionality of which is challenged,
the Court will not be a party to the governmental
action against an individual that results from such
an unconstitutional legislative enactment. For the
Court to validate the application of the unconsti-
tutional statute to the individual would subordi-
nate the Constitution to an ordinary legislative act.
This same reasoning applies to an executive act
which, in violation of the fourth amendment, pro-
duces evidence of crime for use in court. Schrock
and Welsh note that in a fourth amendment case
the defendant's criminality persists despite the
state's inability to obtain a conviction; on the other
hand, striking down a statute eradicates the at-
tending culpability. Schrock and Welsh ask
whether this distinction accords exclusion proceed-
ings a status different from the "Marbury-like re-
view" of statutes. They conclude that there is
sufficient "similarity between the two situations to
compel application of classical judicial review to
searches and seizures.. .. " They explain that
in the case of search and seizure, just as in the
unconstitutional legislation situation, one speaks of
"invalidity": it is accurate and idiomatic to charac-
terize a search as either "valid" or "invalid." As for
substance, whether it be Congress abridging the
freedom of speech or police officers making unrea-
expresses the important distinction between constitu-
tional duty and mere judicial discretion:
The concerns expressed by Justice Brandeis in
Olmstead have been described variously as "the im-
perative of judical integrity," "the normative the-
ory," and the "sporting contest theory." These labels
unfortunately imply a mere desire by the judiciary
to avoid complicity with the government's uncon-
stitutional practices. In order to have a constitu-
tional basis, of course, the exclusionary rule cannot
serve as a mere defensive shield preserving the ju-
diciary's constitutional chastity. And, indeed, this
rationale does have an affirmative aspect insofar as
it enables the courts to fulfill their institutional role
of upholding the Constitution.
Note, supra, at 511.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
sonable searches and seizures, the fact is that govern-
mental actors are doing something repugnant to the
Constitution, and in each case the courts are being
asked to cooperate and therefore condone that re-
pugnant act. What is at stake in each case is the
meaningfulness of the Constitution; the tendency of
judicial acceptance of either kind of act is to make
the Constitution meaningless. 286
There is no significant difference between judicial
review of an unconstitutional search and seizure
producing evidence in a prosecution and judicial
review of a prosecution based on an unconstitu-
tional statute. The government is bound by the
Constitution throughout the entire prosecution of
the individual, and this imperative applies to ac-
tions on the part of all three branches of govern-
ment. Addressing this point in Marbury v. Madison,
Chief Justice Marshall stated that inherent in the
Constitution is the principle "that a law repugnant
to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well
as other departments, are bound by that instru-
ment."28 7 The term "other departments" used by
Marshall applies to the executive branch as well as
to the legislature, and the policeman is as much a
part of that government whose departments are
bound by the Constitution as are members of the
other branches of government.2 s The Court's con-
s6 Schrock & Welsh, supra note 44, at 346-47.
287 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 180.
mss Professor Amsterdam addresses the relationships
between the police officer and the government:
Chief Justice Burger complains that the exclusion-
ary rule treats the government as one piece with the
offending officer. But surely it is unreal to treat the
offending officer as a private malefactor who just
happens to receive a government paycheck. It is the
government that sends him out on the streets with
the job of repressing crime and of gathering criminal
evidence in order to repress it. It is the government
that motivates him to conduct searches and seizures
as a part of his job, empowers him and equips him
to conduct them.
Amsterdam, supra note 130, at 432. Both Chief Justice
Burger and Amsterdam are writing in the context of the
deterrent effect of exclusion, but Amsterdam's observa-
tions nonetheless apply to the judicial review function.
In Olmsteadv. United States Justice Holmes expressed his
view that the separation of powers not be allowed to
obscure the fact that the executive branch and the judi-
cial branch are both branches of the same government.
277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In this passage,
Holmes objects to distinguishing the government as pros-
ecutor and the government as judge. For an extensive
and thoughtful treatment of this "unitary" as opposed to
"fragmented" view of government, see Schrock & Welsh,
supra note 44, at 257-60, a section of their article which
they summarize at 262:
All we have sought to do thus far is to echo the gist
of the simple, but not necessarily "rudimentary,"
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stitutional duty to review the action of the police
is not less than its duty to review actions of the
legislature. Stated somewhat differently, it does not
matter whether a statute is unconstitutional or
whether a constitutional statute is executed and
enforced in an unconstitutional manner. When the
government acts unconstitutionally, the judicial
duty is the same: it must not, according to the
,principle of judicial review, validate unconstitu-
tional governmental action by allowing it to be
used in the prosecution and punishment of an
individual.
Exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence
is thus a natural consequence of constitutionalism,
the rule of law, and the exercise of judicial review
in our system of government.8 9 The principle un-
derlying such exclusion is a venerable one, the
ordinary exercise of judicial review as it validates
or invalidates action of another branch of govern-
ment in determining whether or not to exclude
evidence used in the prosecution of an individual
for crime. The issues of deterrence and judicial
integrity are subordinate to the constitutional ar-
gument that exclusion is required by our system of
constitutional government and the exercise of ju-
dicial review within that system.
The constitutional argument based on judicial
review assumes greater force when considered in
conjunction with the due process clauses of both
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Beyond the
consideration of ordinary judicial review is the fact
that our Constitution provides specifically that no
person shall "be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."20 The judiciary's
place in the system of separated powers puts it in
the position to review legislative and executive
action as it goes about its business of authoritatively
and lawfully depriving persons of life, liberty, or
property. The due process provisions of the Con-
stitution explicitly require that such deprivations
must be in accordance with the Constitution.29 1 If
the judiciary finds a person guilty in a proceeding
Holmes-Brandeis proposition that the government
is an indivisible entity, the prosecution is a single
process, and there is no honest way to give the court
a moral release for wrongful conduct on the part of
the executive in a prosecution made possible only
by the participation of both the court and the
executive.
m Schrock & Welsh, supra note 44, at 371.
290 U.S. CoNSr. amend. V. For the corresponding pro-
tection against state governments, see U.S. CONsx. amend.
XIV.
291 Appellate courts, of course, review the proceedings
of the trial court as well.
in which unconstitutionally seized evidence is used,
it is allowing what the due process clauses prohibit.
VI. CONCLUSION: EXCLUSION AND
CONSTITUTIONALISM
The liberal arguments favoring exclusion have
been examined. It was demonstrated that these
arguments are outgrowths of a liberal credo, ex-
emplified in the work of Ramsey Clark, and of
Packer's due process model. Ramsey Clark's argu-
ments and the due process model have two char-
acteristics in common: Neither is based on a well-
reasoned or substantial constitutional footing. Sec-
ondly, each manifests a parent ideology and model
of the criminal process and a consequential parti-
san understanding of the Constitution. The due
process model is skeptical about the morality and
utility of the criminal sanction. It regards the con-
cept of a free will enabling an individual to choose
whether or not to obey the criminal code as out-
moded and unscientific. Thus, this model exerts
pressures "to expand and liberalize those of its
processes and doctrines which serve to make more
tentative its judgments or limit its powers."2 92
Packer's due process model supports both exclusion
and a judicial broadening of substantive fourth
amendment provisions as a means of limiting dis-
cretionary justice. Supporters of limiting official
discretion urge adoption of this policy as a matter
of constitutional law.
Like its liberal counterpart, each of the conserva-
tive arguments opposing exclusion is a product of
its parent ideology, an ideology espoused by the
Nixon administration and inhering in Professor
Packer's crime control model. Accepting the notion
of free will, the crime control model emphasizes
the threat crime poses to public order and thus to
an important condition of human freedom. Be-
cause of this threat, the model focuses on the
system's efficiency in apprehending and convicting
a high number of criminal offenders. Efficiency
dictates that informality, uniformity, and finality
be maximized. The presumption of guilt also in-
forms this model just as the presumption of inno-
cence informs the due process model. Although the
crime control model tolerates rules forbidding ille-
gal arrests and searches, efficiency requires that
enforcement of these prohibitions be left primarily
to internal administrative sanctions.
2 93
The conservative credo supplies the theoretical
underpinnings for a number of criticisms of exclu-
See text accompanying notes 16-26 supra.
"9a See text accompanying notes 104-05 supra.
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sion. 294 The dictates of its ideological presupposi-
tions would in fact lead the crime control model to
abolish the exclusionary rule as well as to narrow
the scope of the fourth amendment in order to
minimize interference with the apprehension and
disposition of criminal offenders. Like their liberal
counterparts, followers of this conservative position
translate their own ideological presuppositions into
recommendations for constitutional interpreta-
tions. But, as is also the case with the liberal
position, conservative conclusions lack a coherent
supporting constitutional foundation. Each of the
conservative arguments has a liberal refutation.
The empirical literature on exclusion suffers
from similar defects.sss Further abstracting exclu-
sion from its constitutional foundations, empirical
analysis concentrates predominantly on the policy
consideration of deterrence, a consideration which
is one overriding concern of the partisan arguments
discussed above. The above survey of the empirical
research, however, reveals no conclusive answer to
the exclusion controversy, even as narrowed to the
question of deterrence. The complexity of the ques-
tion gives no cause for optimistic expectations of
conclusive results from any forthcoming empirical
studies.
A deficiency of the liberal and conservative ar-
guments and Packer's constructs is that they derive
an interpretation of constitutional policy from a
preconceived conception of the goals of the crimi-
nal process and the role of the judiciary."9 The
central defect of this approach is that conservatives,
liberals and empiricists make the Constitution de-
rivative rather than primary. The due process and
judicial review arguments for exclusion do not
share this defect. Both proceed from the Constitu-
tion and derive the exclusionary rule from its pro-
visions and principles.
Furthermore, unlike Packer's due process model
which likewise requires exclusion, these arguments
do not approach the fourth amendment with a
fundamental opposition to the criminal sanction
and other elements of the model. Rather, they
accept the lines seemingly drawn by the text of the
Constitution. Although the Constitution requires
exclusion, it does not suggest or require a maximi-
zation of restrictions on the exercise of official
294 See section III supra.
295 See section IV supra.
296 This is not necessarily intended as a criticism of
Professor Packer, but rather of the substance of the due
process and crime control models he constructs. See text
accompanying notes 16-26 & 104-05 supra.
power as does Packer's liberal model. On its face,
the fourth amendment seems to adopt neither a
liberal obstructionist position relative to law en-
forcement nor the conservative goal of apprehen-
sion and punishment of criminals as its primary
concern. The fourth amendment provides that
searches and seizures will be reasonable and that
warrants must meet specified requirements. There
appears to be sufficient room in the amendment to
accommodate both considerations of individual
freedom and effective law enforcement.s These
competing goods should be given careful consid-
eration in the course of fashioning substantive rules
of the fourth amendment in judicial rulings on
exclusion.
The case advanced herein to support exclusion
is essentially that the rule derives from the consti-
tutional provisions requiring that deprivations of
life, liberty, and property be in accordance with
due process of law. Exclusion, furthermore, is a
natural consequence of the constitutional doctrine
of judicial review. These are matters of constitu-
tional magnitude which lie beyond ordinary par-
tisanship. Chief Justice Marshall addressed the
significance of constitutional law in Marbury v. Mad-
ison:
That the people have an original right to establish,
for their future government, such principles, as, in
their opinion, shall most conduce to their own hap-
piness is the basis on which the whole American
fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original
right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought
it, to be frequently repeated. The principles, there-
fore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And
as the authority from which they proceed is supreme,
and can seldom act, they are designed to be perma-
nent.m
The argument advanced herein is that exclusion
is one of these principles. Although it may be
attractive to some to dismiss such concern as lim-
iting our charter of government to "a flintlock
constitution," it is a course fraught with danger to
29 For one accommodation of these competing goods,
see Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REy. 929 (1965). Judge Friendly
and others have suggested the possibility that the exclu-
sionary rule could be maintained as it is now enforced if
the constitutional law of search and seizure were made
much less complex and reduced to rules more appropriate
to a constitution than to a code of criminal procedure-
rules which would also be more easily comprehensible to
law enforcement officers.
2s 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
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set the Constitution adrift in a sea of partisan
policy considerations without an anchor in consti-
tutional intent or principle.2 The maintenance of
2 Amsterdam, supra note 130, at 416.
a limiting constitution will restrain the Court from
adopting the mere policy preferences of the Justices
and ensure that justice be administered according
to the Constitution's demands.
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